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In recent years, the Supreme Court has narrowed or eliminated private
rights of action in many legal regimes, much to the chagrin of the legal
academy. That trend, although certainly not limited to health law, has had a
significant impact on the field; the Court’s decisions have eliminated the
private enforcement mechanism for at least three important healthcare
regimes: Medicaid, employer-sponsored insurance, and medical devices. In a
similar trend outside the courts, state legislatures have capped non-economic
and punitive damages for medical malpractice litigation, weakening the tort
system’s deterrent capacity in those states. This Article suggests that the trend
of eliminating private rights of action should be evaluated not as an
elimination of legal enforcement (and creation of a “regulatory vacuum”) but
rather as a shift of regulatory authority from state judicial forums to federal
executive forums. The Article then argues that such a shift might be a wise one
for healthcare, given the particular market failures that justify the regulatory
intervention. In all four stories, federal executive regulators are poised to take
over the regulatory job, and federal executive regulators have the capacity to
do a better job than courts. The Article therefore urges completion rather than
reversal of the reallocation – a consolidation of regulatory authority in the
federal executive and a further disarming of state judicial enforcement power.
INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenarios:
" A state Medicaid agency refuses to pay its doctors at the
reimbursement rate required by federal statute.1
" An employer-sponsored health insurer refuses to cover medically
necessary services that ought to be covered under the insurance
contract.2
" A medical device manufacturer refuses to pull from the market – or
to add warnings to the label of – an FDA-approved product that has
injured patients.3

1

See Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983, and
Medicaid Entitlements, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 413, 415-18 (2008); Abigail R. Moncrieff,
Comment, Payments to Medicaid Doctors: Interpreting the “Equal Access” Provision, 73
U. CHI. L. REV. 673, 673 (2006).
2 See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 204-05 (2004).
3 See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 319-21 (2008); Catherine T. Struve, The
Food and Drug Administration and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance,
Compensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 587, 588
(2005) (explaining how in recent years, because “policymakers have stressed the need to
bring innovative medical treatments to market,” greater deference is paid to FDA’s product
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" A doctor refuses to take cost-justified precautions against injuring
patients.4
How can the legal system bring these actors into compliance with the law?
Since the country’s founding, the predominant answer in the United States
has been that individuals harmed by such violations could sue wrongdoers not
only for individual compensation but also for systemic deterrence. That is, the
American legal system has largely relied on private litigation – primarily
brought under common law theories in state courts – to deter wrongdoing
through punitive damages or court-ordered regulatory change. In the last few
decades, however, the Supreme Court has, in a wide range of regulatory
regimes, curbed individuals’ and courts’ ability to play that role.
This change, although certainly not limited to healthcare law,5 has been
significant for healthcare regulation. With three Supreme Court cases and one
widely-enacted state statutory reform, the private enforcement model has
disappeared from at least four important realms of healthcare law – the four
alluded to in the stories above. First, Medicaid. In Gonzaga University v. Doe,
the Supreme Court narrowed the availability of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for enforcing
federal statutes, especially those enacted under Congress’s spending power.6
That holding, as applied in the lower courts, has made it impossible for
individuals to sue state agencies (or, more precisely, the heads of the agencies)
for certain violations of the federal Medicaid Act, including violations of the
essential “Equal Access Provision” that governs provider reimbursement.7
Second, employer-sponsored insurance (ESI). In Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila,
the Court gave a broad reading and application to the preemption provision of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).8 That
holding, combined with the Court’s narrow reading of ERISA’s remedial
provision, has made it impossible for some patients to hold their insurers
accountable for injuries resulting from wrongful benefits denials.9 Third,
approval).
4 See Abigail R. Moncrieff, Federalization Snowballs: The Need for National Action in
Medical Malpractice Reform, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 844, 855-61 (2009) (reviewing the
literature on medical malpractice reform).
5 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors to Civil Rights Litigants, 5 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 537, 537-39 (2003) (listing a long line of Rehnquist Court decisions that
prevent individuals from suing to enforce civil rights).
6 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 273 (2002).
7 See Huberfeld, supra note 1, at 445-51 (observing that federal appellate courts have
applied Gonzaga to limit or prohibit claims against state Medicaid agencies and predicting
that the Roberts Court will further limit such claims).
8 Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 221 (2004) (holding that ERISA preempts
state laws that would have provided causes of action against insurance companies denying
benefits under “medical necessity” clauses).
9 See id. at 221 n.7 (reserving the question of whether one of ERISA’s remedial
provisions, § 502(a)(3), might allow for consequential or punitive damages); Great-West
Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209-18 (2002) (interpreting § 502(a)(3)
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medical devices. In Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., the Court held that Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) pre-market approval of the riskiest (“Class III”)
medical devices preempts state tort suits challenging those products’ safety and
labeling.10 Because there is no federal cause of action to replace preempted
state laws, that holding has made it impossible for patients to sue
manufacturers for injuries resulting from unsafe devices. Finally, medical
error. In a similar trend outside the Court, several state legislatures have
capped non-economic and punitive damages in medical malpractice litigation,
limiting their own tort systems’ capacity to deter iatrogenic (i.e., physiciancaused) injuries. Of course, medical malpractice litigation still serves
compensatory purposes in those states, but caps limit the tort system’s
regulatory capacity.11
Healthcare regulation has thus lost several of its private enforcement
mechanisms over the past decade, largely to the chagrin of the legal
academy.12 But should those losses actually worry us? Is it problematic that

extremely narrowly); Davila, 542 U.S. at 222 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (arguing that the
Court’s “encompassing interpretation of ERISA’s preemptive force” coupled with its
“cramped construction of the ‘equitable relief’ allowable under § 502(a)(3)” creates a
“‘regulatory vacuum’” in which no remedy exists (citations omitted)); David A. Hyman,
Regulating Managed Care: What’s Wrong with a Patient Bill of Rights, 73 S. CAL. L. REV.
221, 229 (2000) (explaining that ERISA, while preempting state-law remedies, “contains no
substantive regulation of its own, and provides only an exceedingly limited set of
remedies”).
10 Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc, 552 U.S. 312, 312-13 (2008).
11 Granted, the tort system probably wasn’t doing a good job at deterring iatrogenic
injury before the caps. See INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH
SYSTEM 1 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000) (summarizing statistical evidence that suggests
that the frequency of iatrogenic deaths in U.S. hospitals is much higher than commonly
believed). But caps certainly decrease the system’s potential for that kind of regulation.
12 For representative examples of scholarly chagrin at the curbing of private enforcement
in each of the four stories described here, see TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
MYTH 1 (2005) (arguing that attempts to limit medical malpractice litigation are
fundamentally misguided); David Brennan, Federal Preemption of All State Law Tort
Claims in Riegel v. Medtronic: A Need to Undo a Serious Wrong, 36 W. ST. U. L. REV. 137,
165-66 (2008) (“Consumer organizations and groups were quick to realize that users of
Class III medical devices had been effectively disenfranchised from any reasonable remedy
for dangerous or defective devices by a sweeping doctrine of federal preemption doctrine.”);
Margaret Cyr-Provost, Aetna v. Davila: From Patient-Centered Care to Plan-Centered
Care, a Signpost or the End of the Road?, 6 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 171, 179 (2005)
(descrying the fact that today’s legal climate lacks “legal and moral accountability” and
leaves health care consumers without recourse); Huberfeld, supra note 1, at 414 (urging
“legislative responses to the possible demise of the Medicaid entitlement”); Mark Andrew
Ison, Note, Two Wrongs Don’t Make a Right: Medicaid, Section 1983 and the Cost of an
Enforceable Right to Healthcare, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1479, 1516-18 (2003) (highlighting the
potentially “catastrophic” harms to beneficiaries that might result from under-enforcement
after Gonzaga); Theodore W. Ruger, The United State Supreme Court and Health Law: The
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private litigation is no longer an option for enforcing federal Medicaid rules,
contractual insurance provisions, or common law safety standards?
The answer to that question ought to depend on the existence and nature of
alternatives to private litigation.13 If market forces or administrative
enforcement works as well as or better than private litigation, then we ought to
embrace rather than resist the Court’s assault on private actions. In that case,
private actions might inefficiently replicate regulatory deterrence.
This premise is neither new nor radical; scholars of law and economics have
long recognized that common law and administrative law are substitutes, such
that a rising administrative state justifies and even necessitates diminishment
of common law remedies.14 But this premise and mode of analysis is one that
the health law literature has largely overlooked in considering the Supreme
Court’s recent holdings. This Article fills that analytic void, asking not
whether the curbing of healthcare litigation is bad in itself but whether the
curbing of that litigation is bad given the broader regulatory environment for
healthcare and given the particular regulatory needs that healthcare markets
present. That is, I ask and answer the comparative question: whether litigation
is better or worse at setting incentives than its available substitute,
administrative regulation.
An important first step in answering the comparative question is to note that,
in all four stories considered here, administrative regulators already exist and
are already authorized to regulate. For Medicaid, the federal Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) already has the authority to enforce
federal standards against state agencies. For ESI, the Department of Labor
(DOL) (as well as a handful of other agencies since the passage of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)15) already has authority to

Year in Review: The Supreme Court Federalizes Managed Care Liability, 32 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 528, 529 (2004) (“ERISA’s remedial provisions are so penurious that Aetna’s
holding of complete preemption produces a legal regime that vastly under-compensates plan
members who suffer a wrongful denial of care.”).
13 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 383-84 (6th ed. 2003)
(outlining circumstances in which we ought to prefer common law to administrative
regulation and vice versa).
14 For a recent elaboration of this point, see Kyle D. Logue, Coordinating Sanctions in
Tort (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., Olin Ctr. for Law & Econ. Working Paper Series, Paper No.
105, July 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1430596.
15 The Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA), an agency of the Department
of Labor, is primarily responsible for administering the provisions of ERISA. The
enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) and the Health Care
and Education Reconciliation Act, signed into law in March 2010, made some significant
changes to the regulatory structure for employer-sponsored insurance. In particular, EBSA
now shares “interpretive jurisdiction” with the Department of Treasury and the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) over PPACA provisions applicable to employersponsored insurance. EBSA Unified Agenda, Regulations Implementing the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA), available at http://www.dol.gov/

2328

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90: 2323

govern employer-provided healthcare plans, including authority to regulate
administrators’ claims processing. For medical devices, FDA already has
authority to monitor approved devices and to require manufacturers to change
safety labels or to pull unsafe products. For medical error, CMS already has
authority to serve a regulatory role by changing Medicare and Medicaid quality
rules or by establishing an administrative adjudication system for medical
injuries,16 and professional associations already have authority to serve a
regulatory role by changing minimum quality standards for medical licensure.
Why, then, have so many commentators complained of “regulatory
vacuums” left in the wake of the Supreme Court’s holdings? The current
regulatory environment does not lack authoritative figures, and the existing
authoritative figures do not lack legal tools for regulation.17 The regulatory
space, then, is not at all vacuous, despite the abolition of private rights of
action; federal executive agencies are well equipped to engage in the
regulatory project, even though individuals and courts are no longer allowed to
pursue it.
These anxious commentators, though, are not completely off-base; they are
simply over-stating the problem. The problem today is not a lack of regulatory
presence but rather a lack of regulatory rigor. The existing administrative
regulators simply don’t do the jobs that the Supreme Court and state
legislatures have left for them: CMS hardly ever withdraws funding from or
refuses approval to state Medicaid plans that violate federal standards;18 DOL
ebsa/regs/unifiedagenda/spring-2010/1210-AB41.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). The
EBSA Unified Agenda states that the three departments “are proceeding concurrently to
provide regulatory guidance regarding [implementation of PPACA] provisions.” Id. Thus,
the agencies will jointly issue interpretations of relevant PPACA provisions. Id. According
to EBSA, initial regulatory action will likely require insurers to extend dependent coverage
and cover preventive health services without cost sharing and address PPACA provisions
that prohibit insurers from establishing lifetime or annual limits on benefits, rescinding
health coverage after coverage begins, excluding potential beneficiaries based on preexisting conditions and health status, and discriminating in favor of highly compensated
individuals. Id. PPACA also imposes requirements on internal claims appeal and external
review procedures that are applicable to group health plans. See infra note 86 and
accompanying text.
16 Eleanor Kinney and Bill Sage have already proposed at least a limited version of this
idea, arguing that CMS should adjudicate malpractice claims brought by Medicare and
Medicaid beneficiaries. See Eleanor D. Kinney & William M. Sage, Dances with
Elephants: Administrative Resolution of Medical Injury Claims by Medicare Beneficiaries,
5 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1, 2 (2008); Eleanor D. Kinney & William M. Sage, Resolving
Medical Malpractice Claims in the Medicare Program: Can It Be Done?, 12 CONN. INS. L.J.
77, 90 (2005-2006); William M. Sage, The Role of Medicare in Medical Malpractice
Reform, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 217, 225-28 (2006).
17 That said, the relevant administrative agencies do not have sufficient financial
resources to engage in the projects that I urge here. That is, they have legal tools but lack
practical resources. For more on this point, see infra Part IV.B.3.
18 Jon Donenberg, Medicaid and Beneficiary Enforcement: Maintaining State
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neither provides an administrative system for claims review nor punishes
abusive MCOs; FDA rarely monitors the safety of devices that have gone
through pre-market approval and have entered the market; and neither CMS
nor professional medical associations actively enforce quality standards for
practicing providers.19 In short, to the extent that the executive already
regulates these fields, it does far too little to make up for a lack of parallel
private enforcement. For now, thus, the Supreme Court and state legislatures
have left health law not so much with regulatory vacuums as with enforcement
vacuums, within which Medicaid agencies, employer-sponsored insurers,
device manufacturers, and sloppy doctors can shirk legal obligations with
relative impunity – all despite the existence of a robust regulatory structure.
Unlike a true regulatory vacuum, an enforcement vacuum does not strongly
suggest that the best solution is to restore the status quo ante, re-establishing
private rights of action (the solution that most scholars have advocated so far).
Instead, the enforcement vacuum presents a choice between two clear and easy
alternatives: (1) re-empowering the enforcement mechanism that was working
before (private litigation) or (2) motivating (and funding) the enforcement
mechanisms that are not yet working today (administrative regulation).
This Article urges the latter approach, primarily for reasons of comparative
institutional competence. The federal agencies have greater capacity to
regulate well than courts and juries.
The Supreme Court’s and state legislatures’ assaults on litigation, if
understood as a vote of confidence for administrative regulators over common
law and other judicial regulators, can be understood to embody a growing
skepticism towards state judicial forums and an emerging trust in national
executive forums for creating and enforcing healthcare rules. Each story
considered here suggests a straightforward reallocation of regulatory
responsibilities from the judiciary to the executive as well as a lessstraightforward-but-nevertheless-real reallocation of regulatory responsibilities
between the state and federal governments. (In the stories of employersponsored insurance and drug and device manufacturers, the federalist
reallocation is a simple shift from state to national governance; in the Medicaid
and medical malpractice stories, the federalist reallocation is more muddled,
but like the others, these stories involve a shift of authority away from state
forums.)
Particularly in healthcare, this balance of skepticism towards judicial and
state forums and trust in executive and national forums may be well-founded.

Compliance with Federal Availability Requirements, 117 YALE L.J. 1498, 1501 (2008)
(finding that CMS’s withdrawal power is “rarely, if ever, invoked” (quoting Lisa E. Key,
Private Enforcement of Federal Funding Conditions Under § 1983: The Supreme Court’s
Failure to Adhere to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283, 293
(1996))).
19 For discussion of CMS’s growing interest in quality regulation, particularly including
its “never events” and “pay for performance” policies, see infra Part II.A.4.
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As we have long recognized, generalist juries and judges are bad at
understanding, evaluating, and creating healthcare regulations20 – and expert
agencies might be much better.21 Furthermore, federal regulation of healthcare
might make more sense than state regulation for a variety of reasons, especially
considering the economies of scale that we gain from operating nation-wide.22
The shift from state courts to federal agencies therefore seems a wise shift,
such that the mere re-creation of private rights of action – the rejection of this
reallocative trend – does not seem the best solution to our current enforcement
vacuums. Instead, we should embrace the reallocations, and the federal
executive bodies that are poised to regulate should start doing the jobs that the
Supreme Court and state legislatures have left to them. Fulfilling this shift will
probably require some restructuring of administrative bodies and will certainly
require additional funding for the federal regulators, but the move should not
require substantive amendment of the regulatory statutes.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I fleshes out the four stories identified
here, noting the assaults on litigation and the curbing of private rights of action
in the four exemplar healthcare regimes. Part II fleshes out the problem of
enforcement vacuums, identifying the entity in each story that could regulate in
the absence of litigation, noting that those entities have not yet stepped in to fill
the regulatory role, and identifying the market failures that persist in the
absence of regulation. Part III fleshes out the judicial-to-executive and state20

See Lawrence Gostin, The Formulation of Health Policy by the Three Branches of
Government, in SOCIETY’S CHOICES: SOCIAL AND ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN
BIOMEDICINE 335, 339-40 (Ruth Ellen Bulger et al. eds., 1995) (describing the limits of
courts in healthcare policymaking); William M. Sage & Rogan Kersh, Introduction to
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 4 (William M. Sage & Rogan
Kersh eds., 2006) (outlining potential changes to the medical malpractice litigation process
which could substantially increase the “accuracy and consistency of outcomes”); NEIL
VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY 3-6 (1995) (reviewing criticism
of juries by American Medical Association and others); Peter Huber, Safety and the Second
Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 31920, 332-33 (1985) (arguing that juries are institutionally unable to make risk choices and
that decisions should be made by regulatory agencies); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries,
and Patent Cases – An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 370
(2000) (“[P]opular perceptions of juror incompetence and bias have caused commentators to
argue that the role of the jury in patent litigation should be severely limited, and many
alternatives have been proposed.”); David M. Studdert & Michelle M. Mello, When Tort
Resolutions Are “Wrong”: Predictors of Discordant Outcomes in Medical Malpractice
Litigation, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S47, S48-52 (2007). But see VIDMAR, supra, at 161-82
(arguing that juries are competent and that medical malpractice liability system is generally
sound).
21 Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health Law and Administrative Law: A Marriage Most
Convenient, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 16-30 (2004) (describing the executive’s comparative
advantages over both the judiciary and the market for regulating healthcare); Huber, supra
note 20, at 285, 307-26.
22 See Moncrieff, supra note 4, at 848.
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to-federal reallocation trends that each story represents and discusses the
reasons that we might like those trends for health law. Part IV identifies the
range of possible solutions for filling enforcement vacuums and argues that our
general preference should be for federal executive regulation, even to the full
exclusion of state judicial regulation.
I.

THE ASSAULT ON LITIGATION

In recent years, the Supreme Court has closed courthouse doors to many
litigants, particularly those alleging generalized statutory violations or
otherwise attempting to use the court system for systemic regulation.23 This
trend has affected a wide range of regulatory regimes, including disabilities
law,24 employment and labor law,25 and civil rights law.26 It has also had a
significant impact on health law. The Court’s recent jurisprudence has
disarmed private litigation for Medicaid enforcement, employer-sponsored
insurance regulation, and medical device regulation.
Beyond the Supreme Court, another major trend against private enforcement
mechanisms in health law has been the state legislatures’ limitation or
elimination of non-economic and punitive damages in medical malpractice
litigation. These damages caps at least attempt to serve the same purpose,
dissuading courts and litigants in their attempts to regulate physician
negligence.27
This Part fleshes out the four stories of health law’s trend away from the
private enforcement model.

23

See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 537-39 (listing cases from 2001 and 2002 that
limited civil rights plaintiffs’ access to courts).
24 See, e.g., Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002) (holding that punitive damages are
unavailable under § 202 of the Americans with Disabilities Act and § 505(a)(2) of the
Rehabilitation Act); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding
that state governments cannot be sued for violating the Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act).
25 See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (requiring
arbitration of employment-related claims of state discrimination).
26 Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002) (requiring prisoners to exhaust
administrative remedies before filing suit alleging excessive force by corrections officers);
Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 740-41 (2001) (finding that prisoners must exhaust prison
administrative remedies before seeking money damages in court); Alexander v. Sandoval,
532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (finding that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not
contain a private right of action).
27 The empirical evidence so far indicates that damages caps have had little if any effect
on awards recovered in medical malpractice cases and have had little impact on healthcare
costs. See Moncrieff, supra note 4, at 855 n.37. That said, the spirit of the caps is the same
as the spirit of the other limits on private enforcement; the attempt is to dissuade litigation.
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Gonzaga and Medicaid

In Gonzaga University v. Doe28 (a decision that Chief Justice Rehnquist
called his “sleeper case” of 200229), the Supreme Court narrowed the
availability of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for enforcing federal statutes.30 Section 1983
provides a private right of action against state actors for deprivations “of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the
United States.31 Because the provision refers to laws as well as the
Constitution, plaintiffs have long used § 1983 to enforce federal statutes
against state agents.
But in Gonzaga, the Court held that § 1983 did not provide a right of action
for a violation of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA),32
finding that FERPA did not create any “personal rights”33 that could be
vindicated through a § 1983 action. In so holding, the Court announced a more
restrictive test for the availability of § 1983 for correcting federal statutory
violations, allowing private enforcement of only those federal statutes that
intended to create and confer individual rights in the plaintiff. In other words,
the Court announced that plaintiffs could use § 1983 only to protect their own
rights, not to enforce a general statutory scheme (even when such enforcement
would provide the plaintiff a direct and tangible benefit).
Importantly, two of the Court’s central considerations – beyond the text of
the relevant provision – in holding that FERPA did not create and confer
individual rights were, first, that FERPA was a Spending Clause statute and,
second, that the statute specified a regulatory enforcement scheme, charging
the Secretary of Education with withdrawing federal funds from noncompliant
institutions.34 Because Congress passed the statute merely as a grants program
for the states, because Congress intended for the statute to be enforced through
regulatory funding decisions, and because the relevant provision did not clearly
create and confer an enforceable right in the plaintiff, the Court reasoned, the
legislature must not have intended to allow individual private enforcement
through § 1983.35
28

536 U.S. 273 (2002).
Erwin Chemerinsky & Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation: Supreme Court
Review, 19 TOURO L. REV. 625, 663 (2003).
30 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 276.
31 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
32 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006).
33 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 276.
34 Id. at 278-79.
35 Of course, even after Gonzaga, Congress can pass provisions under its Spending
Clause power that create and confer individual rights. The text of the provision is the first
line of inquiry, and if it seems to be rights-creating text, then the courts will still allow
private enforcement. See Huberfeld, supra note 1, at 446-47 (observing that several circuits
still allow Medicaid beneficiaries to use § 1983 to enforce the “minimum services”
provision, which vests individual rights in beneficiaries).
29

2010]

COURT’S ASSAULT ON PRIVATE HEALTH LITIGATION

2333

Since Gonzaga was decided, all but one of the federal courts of appeal that
have considered the question have applied Gonzaga to preclude individual
enforcement of several Medicaid provisions, including a central Medicaid
requirement known as the Equal Access Provision.36 The Equal Access
Provision is a part of the federal Medicaid Act, requiring state agencies to
reimburse providers at a rate that is “consistent with efficiency, economy, and
quality of care and [is] sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and
services are available under the plan at least to the extent that such care and
services are available to the general population in the geographic area.”37 In
short, it requires state agencies to pay doctors at a rate that is competitive with
private market payments.38 The fear that motivates the provision is that
doctors will refuse to treat Medicaid patients if the program pays too little.39
Before Gonzaga was decided, providers and patients could (and did) use
§ 1983 to enforce the Equal Access Provision, suing heads of state Medicaid
agencies for cutting reimbursement rates on the ground that the cut rate would
be too low to meet federal statutory requirements.40 Since Gonzaga, however,
most courts of appeal have held that the Equal Access Provision does not
create and confer enforceable rights and have therefore held that providers and
patients lack standing to enforce the provision.41
Of course, that holding seems right under the Gonzaga logic. Like FERPA,
the Medicaid Act is a spending statute; its central creation is not a substantive
federal program like Medicare but rather a set of grants to subsidize state-run

36 See Andrew R. Gardella, Note, The Equal Access Illusion: A Growing Majority of
Federal Courts Erroneously Foreclose Private Enforcement of § 1396a(a)(30) of the
Medicaid Act Using 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 697, 733-42 (2008) (discussing
cases in which the First, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held that the Equal
Access Provision does not create an individual right enforceable under § 1983 while only
the Eight Circuit has held that it does).
37 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2006).
38 See Moncrieff, supra note 1, at 685-87.
39 Id. at 684-85 (explaining that the basic purpose of the Equal Access Provision was to
avoid a “dual-tracked” medical system in which Medicaid beneficiaries would have access
to different and worse doctors than patients with non-Medicaid insurance).
40 See id. at 677-78 (describing pre-Gonzaga cases).
41 See AlohaCare v. Haw. Dep’t Human Servs., 572 F.3d 740, 746 (9th Cir. 2009)
(finding that AlohaCare did not have a private right of action under several Medicaid
sections related to the state’s ability and limitations in contracting with providers); Equal
Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697, 703 (5th Cir. 2007); Long Term Care
Pharmacy Alliance v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50, 51, 57-59 (1st Cir. 2004); Devi M. Rao, Note,
“Making Medical Assistance Available”: Enforcing the Medicaid Act’s Availability
Provision Through § 1983 Litigation, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1440, 1461-62 n.155. But see
Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644, 655-57 (9th Cir. 2009)
(upholding a preliminary injunction against California’s rate reduction legislation on the
ground that it would violate the Supremacy Clause).
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public health insurance.42 Also like FERPA, the Medicaid Act’s substantive
requirements – including the Equal Access Provision – are “requirements”
only insofar as states that refuse to comply will risk losing their Medicaid
grants. That is, the substantive requirements are merely conditions for receipt
of federal funds.43 And finally, like FERPA, the Medicaid Act charges a
federal administrator – the head of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services – with enforcing the Act’s substantive requirements by denying
federal funding to any non-compliant Medicaid plan.
Given that the Medicaid Act’s structure is so similar to FERPA’s structure,
the conclusion is rightly the same: the Equal Access Provision did not intend to
create or confer privately enforceable rights.44 But, of course, that holding
strips individuals of the power to enforce certain Medicaid rules through
litigation, even when those individuals have been harmed by the statutory
violation. In other words, the holding disarms private litigation in Medicaid
regulation.45
B.

Davila and Employer-Sponsored Insurance

In the second story, the Supreme Court did not narrow or eliminate private
rights of action per se but rather interpreted the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)46 in a way that effectually foreclosed private
actions against employer-sponsored managed care organizations (MCOs). In
42

See Jerry L. Mashaw & Dylan S. Calsyn, Block Grants, Entitlements, and Federalism:
A Conceptual Map of Contested Terrain, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 297, 304-05 (1996)
(describing the interactions of state and federal funding in Medicaid and the interactions of
state and federal law in Medicaid before Gonzaga).
43 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (stating that Congress has
constitutional authority to “attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds”).
44 There are, however, several individual provisions of the Medicaid Act that have been
found to confer individual rights. See Grammer v. John J. Kane Reg’l Ctrs.-Glen Hazel, 570
F.3d 520, 527 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding that Medicaid’s Federal Nursing Home Reform
Amendments created individuals rights); Rabin v. Wilson-Coker, 362 F.3d 190, 201-02 (2d
Cir. 2004) (holding that an eligibility provision codified as § 1396r-6 does create and confer
enforceable rights); Gean v. Hattaway, 330 F.3d 758, 772-73 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that
the “right to fair hearing” provision, § 1396a(a)(3), “creates an obligation on the part of the
State and is phrased in terms of benefitting Medicaid recipients”); see also Brian J. Dunne,
Comment, Enforcement of the Medicaid Act Under 42 USC § 1983 After Gonzaga
University v Doe: The “Dispassionate Lens” Examined, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 991, 996-1012
(2007) (discussing the circuit courts’ various interpretive methodologies for determining
whether an enforceable right exists and noting some provisions that continue to be
enforceable after Gonzaga); Rao, supra note 41, at 1463-80 (explaining that the Medicaid
Act’s Availability Clause has been found enforceable under Gonzaga and urging that
Clause’s continued enforcement even after recent amendments to the Medicaid Act).
45 See Mashaw & Calsyn, supra note 42, at 304 (describing the importance of § 1983
litigation, before Gonzaga, for enforcing federal Medicaid requirements).
46
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 502(a)(1)(B), 88
Stat. 891 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006))
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Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila,47 the question before the Court was whether
ERISA preempts state laws that expose employer-sponsored MCOs to
consequential and punitive damages for injuries resulting from claim denials.
The Court held that it did.
In Davila, a Texas doctor had recommended that his patient, Juan Davila,
take Vioxx for arthritis pain rather than a cheaper alternative drug, Naprosin.48
The doctor’s recommendation was based on Davila’s history of stomach ulcers
and the knowledge that Naprosin could, as a side-effect, aggravate Davila’s
gastrointestinal condition. Despite the doctor’s recommendation, Davila’s
employer-sponsored MCO, Aetna, denied the claim for Vioxx but agreed to
cover Naprosin, asserting that Davila should try the cheaper option first.
Rather than paying out-of-pocket for Vioxx, Davila accepted Aetna’s direction
and started on Naprosin. As the doctor had feared, the Naprosin severely
worsened Davila’s gastrointestinal problems, causing serious and lasting
injury. Davila sued Aetna under Texas statutory law, asserting that Aetna was
negligent in denying the claim for Vioxx against the doctor’s recommendation
and asserting on that basis that the MCO was liable for his injuries, a claim that
the Texas statute explicitly allowed.
The case reached the Supreme Court, which held that ERISA preempted the
state statute. Because ERISA itself provides a cause of action “to recover
benefits due,”49 the Court held that the Texas statute fell “within the scope” of
ERISA and thereby triggered ERISA’s preemption provision.50 With that
holding, the Court shielded employer-sponsored MCOs from any and all state
tort liability for coverage decisions that proximately cause injury to patients.51
Standing alone, of course, the Davila decision does not entirely disarm
private litigation because it allows individual suit under the ERISA civil action
and remedial provisions.52 But in a prior decision,53 the Court had also held
47

542 U.S. 200, 204 (2004).
This case looks ironic in retrospect, given what we now know about Vioxx and its
impact on heart health. See Juhana Karha & Eric J. Topol, The Sad Story of Vioxx, and
What We Should Learn from It, 71 CLEV. CLINIC J. MED. 933, 933 (2004) (discussing the
implications of the Vioxx scandal on the prescription drug market); Editorial, Vioxx: An
Unequal Partnership Between Safety and Efficacy, 364 LANCET 1287, 1288 (2004)
(describing one study on the use of Vioxx that “revealed a significant increase in the number
of myocardial infarctions in patients taking rofecoxib [(Vioxx)] compared with those
receiving naproxen [(Aleve)]”); Peter Loftus & Jonathan D. Rockoff, Merck Settles Some
Vioxx Suits, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2010, at B4 (“[Merck] removed Vioxx from the market in
2004, after a study showed the painkiller doubled the risk of heart attack or stroke.”).
49 ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 502(a)(1)(B), 88 Stat. 891, 891 (1974) (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006)).
50 Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 200, 210-14.
51 Id. at 221 n.7 (holding that ERISA preempts state law but reserving the question of
whether one of ERISA’s remedial provisions, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), might allow for
consequential or punitive damages).
52 See ERISA § 502.
48
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that ERISA’s remedial provision, which provides for “equitable relief”54 in the
case of a wrongful benefits denial, allows patients to recover only the value of
the denied benefit. In other words, if Davila had sued under ERISA instead of
the Texas statute, he could have recovered only the cost of Vioxx coverage.
He could not have recovered any consequential damages for the injury to his
gastrointestinal system, nor could he have recovered punitive damages to deter
Aetna from denying future valid claims.
Given ERISA’s broad preemptive force and narrow remedial scheme,
patients are now completely unable to use litigation for regulation when their
employer-sponsored health insurers abuse discretion in claims processing.55
When an MCO denies a claim, the patient can use ERISA to enforce the
contract – can get specific performance – but she cannot recover make-whole
damages for resulting injuries nor effect punishment for the violation nor
deterrence of future violations.
C.

Medtronic and Medical Devices

Like the ERISA story, the medical devices story centers on federal
preemption of state-law causes of action rather than on direct limitations of
private enforcement. In Riegel v. Medtronic, the Supreme Court held that
federal statute preempts common-law products liability suits against those
medical devices that have been approved for the market through the Food and
Drug Administration’s (FDA) premarket approval process.56
The question in Riegel was whether an express preemption provision in the
Medical Device Amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)57
preempted Charles Riegel’s common law complaints against Medtronic’s
balloon catheter. Riegel’s doctors had used the Medtronic catheter to open his
arteries, despite the fact that the catheter was contraindicated for a patient in
Riegel’s condition.58 The catheter exploded, causing serious injury.
Because FDA had found the catheter to be safe and effective through its
premarket approval process (the most extensive and rigorous of FDA’s safety
and efficacy inquiries)59 and because the FDCA provision governing premarket

53

Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209-18 (2001)
(interpreting ERISA’s remedial provision extremely narrowly).
54 ERISA, § 502(a)(3).
55 Davila, 542 U.S. at 222 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court’s
“encompassing interpretation of ERISA’s preemptive force” coupled with its “cramped
construction of the ‘equitable relief’ allowable under § 502(a)(3)” creates a “‘regulatory
vacuum’” in which no remedy exists (citations omitted)).
56 Riegel v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312, 320-29 (2008).
57 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006).
58 Riegel, 552 U.S. at 320.
59 See id. at 316-20 (describing the premarket approval process for Class III medical
devices); Jordan Paradise et al., Evaluating Oversight of Human Drugs and Medical
Devices: A Case Study of the FDA and Implications for Nanobiotechnology, 37 J.L. MED. &
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approvals expressly preempted state-based safety and efficacy requirements,60
Medtronic argued that it could not be held liable under state-based commonlaw theories of strict liability, breach of warranty, or negligence.61 The Court
agreed with Medtronic, holding that common law duties constitute state-based
safety and efficacy “requirements” and therefore fall within the scope of the
FDCA’s preemption provision.62
This holding has the same effect as the Davila holding; Riegel prevents
individuals from raising an alarm and compelling disclosures in state court
when medical devices malfunction, just as Davila prevents individuals from
raising an alarm in state court when employer-sponsored MCOs misbehave.63
Also like the holding in Davila, the holding in Riegel entirely prevents
individuals from using litigation as regulation because the federal alternative –
the FDCA (like ERISA) – does not provide for federal actions to recover
consequential or punitive damages for malfunctioning devices.64 Indeed, the
medical device situation after Riegel may be even starker than the ESI situation
after Davila because the FDCA does not provide any cause of action to replace
the preempted state torts. It is thus entirely impossible after Riegel for
individuals harmed by certain medical devices to enforce legal safety
requirements against the devices’ manufacturers.65
D.

State Legislatures and Medical Malpractice

The fourth story of disappearing private enforcement is different in kind and
scope from the others, but it marks the same trend of limiting private
enforcement. It is the story of state statutory limits on damages arising from
medical malpractice. Since the 1970s, which marked the first medical
malpractice “crisis” of the modern era,66 state legislatures have sought to limit
ETHICS 598, 601-02 (2009) (describing FDA approval processes for medical devices in
various classes).
60 See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a), quoted in Riegel, 552 U.S. at 316.
61 See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 319-21.
62 Id. at 322-23.
63 See Lawrence O. Gostin, The Deregulatory Effects of Preempting Tort Litigation:
FDA Regulation of Medical Devices, 299 JAMA 2313, 2315 (2008) (outlining the benefits
of a tort system for device regulation, including tort’s ability “through the discovery process
. . . [to] compel corporations to disclose everything they know, or reasonably should know,
about [a medical device’s] safety and effectiveness”).
64 See id. at 2313 (explaining that Riegel “removes all means of judicial recourse for
most consumers injured by defective medical devices”).
65 But see Bruce Patsner, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.: Revisiting Preemption for Medical
Devices, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 305, 306 (Summer 2009) (describing the limits of the
Riegel holding); Malika Kanodia, Note, The Fate of the Injured Patient in the Wake of
Riegel v. Medtronic: Should Congress Interject?, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 791, 813-14 (2009)
(explaining that the FDCPA does not preempt some limited tort claims as long as the
requirements of the tort claim are sufficiently similar to federal requirements).
66 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice
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costs arising from medical malpractice litigation. One of the most popular
reform measures among state legislatures, following California’s Medical
Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975, has been to cap or otherwise limit
noneconomic and punitive damages that a plaintiff can recover for iatrogenic
injuries.67 As of 2010, forty-one states limit noneconomic or punitive damages
in some way.68
This story is different in scope and kind from the others for two reasons.
First and most obviously, its source is different. The story is a political one
rather than a judicial one and a state-based one rather than a federal one. The
medical malpractice caps might therefore bear greater political legitimacy than
the Court’s limits on private enforcement, and the caps obviously are not
uniform across the country, as the Court’s limits are. The second reason for
difference is slightly subtler: whereas the Court’s holdings have firmly closed
courthouse doors to individual litigants, the medical malpractice caps have not.
Patients can still bring medical malpractice claims in every state; the caps
merely decrease patients’ incentive to litigate and their ability to use such
litigation to penalize misbehaving doctors.
Despite these differences, the caps mark the same trend as the Court’s
decisions. By decreasing individual litigants’ incentive to sue and ability to
penalize, medical malpractice damages caps limit the potential of private
enforcement to deter medical negligence.69 Furthermore, because the limits
apply only to noneconomic and punitive damages, the caps do not primarily
limit the tort system’s compensatory role but rather its deterrence goal. This
Insurance Crisis: Constitutional Implications, 55 TEX. L. REV. 759, 759-61 (1977);
Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis,
1975 DUKE L.J. 1417, 1417 (1975). But see, e.g., NEAL C. HOGAN, UNHEALED WOUNDS:
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 129-33 (Eric Rise ed., 2003)
(recounting the emergence of the malpractice crisis and dating it back to the 1950s); Cecilia
Loh, An Overview of Medical Malpractice and the Tort Reform Debate, CASE WESTERN
(Apr. 23, 2003), http://www.case.edu/med/epidbio/mphp439/Malpractice.htm (dating the
first medical malpractice “crisis” to 1840).
67 See Ronen Avraham, Database of State Tort Law Reforms (DSTLR, 3rd) (Apr. 1,
2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=902711 (listing several state limitations on punitive and
noneconomic damages); Medical Malpractice/Medical Liability, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=18516 (last updated Mar. 22,
2010) [hereinafter NCSL].
68 NCSL, supra note 67. Of the nine states that do not currently have damages caps, two
have had such caps declared unconstitutional, and one has a constitutional provision
specifically prohibiting such caps.
In Oregon, the monetary cap was deemed
unconstitutional, but the State continues to prohibit punitive damages absent a showing of
malice. Id.
69 As previously noted, these caps have not been terribly successful at limiting
malpractice awards, according to most empirical studies. Nevertheless, the motivation for
the legislation seems to be the same as the motivation for the Supreme Court’s holdings.
See supra note 27.
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feature of the caps places them squarely in the relevant trend away from
litigation as a mechanism for regulation; as the Supreme Court made clear in
its definition of § 1983’s scope, the motivation for the trend is not to eliminate
individuals’ ability to vindicate their own legal rights but rather to shift
systemic regulation and enforcement out of the judicial system.
II.

ALTERNATIVES AND VACUUMS

If that’s right – if the goal of these limits on private litigation is to shift
systemic regulation and enforcement out of state courts (rather than simply to
prevent litigation) – then the obvious next question is where those functions
are supposed to shift to. The answer needn’t be legal, in the traditional sense;
competitive private markets and their reputational sanctions might suffice to
prevent inefficiencies, such that the answer could be “out of state courts and
into the market.” But because some disciplining force is necessary to restrain
self-interested actors, we need to ask whether the private market performs that
function in each case and, if not – if the market will fail, whether our nonjudicial public regulators can work to correct market failures.
In each of the stories considered here, private markets are extremely likely
to fail, due to high information and agency costs.70 But an alternative to
individual litigation already exists – and has existed throughout each story’s
timeline – with the tools necessary to correct market failures. Unfortunately,
the alternative public regulators have not yet fully taken the disciplining role
that the Supreme Court and state legislators have left to them, and that lag
represents a serious problem in each of these four stories. Part II.A identifies
the alternative regulator in each story and demonstrates that none of these
regulators has fulfilled the role left to it. Part II.B describes the information
and agency costs that cause each of these markets to fail in the resulting
enforcement vacuums.
A.

The Alternative Regulators
1.

Medicaid and CMS

In the Medicaid story, the alternative regulator is the federal agency charged
with administering the Medicaid program: the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services.71 Since Medicaid’s creation in 1965, CMS (or one of its
predecessors, the Health Care Financing Administration or the Department of

70 But see Richard A. Epstein & David A. Hyman, Controlling the Cost of Medical Care:
A Dose of Deregulation 1-2 (Feb. 17, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/ abstract=1158547 (arguing that private markets will provide better results
for the healthcare industry, at least in terms of cost controls, than public regulators).
71 CMS is a division of the Department of Health and Human Services. See CENTERS
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, www.cms.hhs.gov/home/medicaid.asp (last visited
Sept. 12, 2010).
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Health, Education, and Welfare) has had statutory authority to approve or
reject “state plans for medical assistance,” i.e., state Medicaid plans.72
At its inception, the federal statute specified twenty-two conditions that state
plans had to meet in order to qualify for federal funding, codified in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a).73 Even before the 2010 Medicaid expansion that accompanied
President Obama’s healthcare reform legislation, the § 1396a(a) list had grown
to seventy-three requirements74; the 2010 legislation adds even more.
Furthermore, countless new statutory sections have joined company with
§ 1396a(a) in conditioning federal funds.75 But the basic structure of the
program has been the same since 1965: states submit plans for medical
assistance, and the Medicaid Administrator (now in CMS) reviews those plans
for compliance, either approving or rejecting federal funds.76
Given this structure, it might make sense to ask why we ever allowed
litigation against state agents to enforce the federal statute. If CMS is doing its
job, then no plan will receive federal funds and go into effect under the
Medicaid moniker if it does not, in CMS’s opinion, comply fully with the
federal statute. Under such a program, it seems nonsensical to allow suit
against the head of the state agency for violating the federal law; it would
make more sense to allow an administrative suit or complaint against CMS for
poor judgment in measuring the states’ compliance – perhaps a claim of
arbitrariness or capriciousness in approving state plans.77 If § 1983 had never
been in the picture, that enforcement mechanism might well have developed.
Perhaps because § 1983 suits were permitted and sufficed to police
violations, however, CMS and its predecessors have never served much of a
gatekeeping function and have never answered for that failure in administrative
litigation.78 Instead, CMS tends to rubber-stamp state plans and to pass the
72 Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1901, 79 Stat. 343, 344 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1
(2006)) (“The sums made available under this section shall be used for making payments to
States which have submitted, and had approved by the Secretary, State plans for medical
assistance.”).
73 § 1902, 79 Stat. at 344-48 (listing twenty-two requirements).
74 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(1)-(73) (West 2009)
75 For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a passed in 1965 with three subsections, (a)-(c); even
before the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) passed, the list went all the
way through subsection (ee). The Medicaid statute as a whole consisted of five sections
when first passed: §§ 1901–1905. Even before PPACA, the statute included forty-five
sections, codified between 42 U.S.C. § 1396a and 42 U.S.C. § 1396w-2. PPACA adds even
more.
76 See Dunne, supra note 44, at 994-95 (discussing the options available to CMS for
enforcing federal Medicaid requirements).
77 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
78 See Edward A. Tomlinson & Jerry L. Mashaw, The Enforcement of Federal Standards
in Grant-in-Aid Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary Involvement, 58 VA. L. REV. 600,
619-20 (1976) (describing the weakness of the federal agency’s incentives to enforce federal
requirements against state agencies); Dunne, supra note 44, at 994-95 (explaining that CMS
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buck to state agencies when providers and beneficiaries complain.79 In fact,
CMS directs more of its Medicaid resources to policing individual providers’
compliance with Medicaid fraud and abuse laws than policing state agencies’
compliance with the federal statute.80 On the occasions that CMS does reject
state plans or insist on amendments thereto, it almost always does so to protect
its own funds from perceived state raids.81 In that framework, CMS is unlikely
to enforce something like the Equal Access Provision, which would, in its
violation, save federal money. Furthermore, CMS has never developed a
robust administrative remedy for individuals wanting to challenge CMS
approval of Medicaid plans.82 Although some administrative processes exist
for raising challenges to Medicaid plans, including challenges to
reimbursement rates, Medicaid’s administrative process (unlike Medicare’s)
has never been an effective means of enforcing the federal statute.83
In the end, then, although CMS has the authority (the duty, really) to enforce
the federal statute against state agencies, it has never created an enforcement
scheme that would work to police state failures. Section 1983 suits have
historically been the only effective means of enforcing the Medicaid Act
against disobedient state agencies and state legislatures. Now, there seems to
be no legal mechanism for doing so.
2.

ESI and DOL

In the employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) story, the primary alternative
legal regulator is the Department of Labor (DOL),84 which is charged with
administering the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).85
rarely, if ever, enforces federal requirements “in a punitive sense” and discussing reasons
for that failure).
79 See sources cited infra note 107.
80 See Huberfeld, supra note 1, at 466.
81 See
generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-574T, MEDICAID:
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS HAVE FACILITATED STATE FINANCING SCHEMES (2004)
(describing CMS and Congressional efforts to curtail state financing schemes that
inappropriately increase federal Medicaid matching payments).
82 See Huberfeld, supra note 1, at 465.
83 Id. Part of the reason for this failure, as many commentators have noted, is that the
only regulatory tool that CMS has in the Medicaid program is withdrawal or withholding of
funds. Dunne, supra note 44, at 994-95. That enforcement mechanism would have perverse
effects if CMS’s goal were to force states to provide more generous – rather than less
generous – coverage; the withdrawal of federal funding would obviously harm the states’
capacity to be generous.
84 The Department of Health and Human Services has become an important secondary
regulator with the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which charges
the HHS Secretary with enforcing external review requirements. See Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1104(4), 124 Stat. 119, 151 (2010).
85 29 U.S.C. § 1135 (2006) (authorizing the Secretary of Labor to promulgate regulations
for interpretation and enforcement of ERISA); Dietz et al., Pensions and Retirement Funds,
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ERISA gives DOL broad statutory authority to enforce its terms, such that the
agency has a variety of mechanisms available for regulating ESI generally and
for regulating employer-sponsored MCOs’ claims processing decisions in
particular.86 First, the agency could set up an administrative complaints
process, adjudicating individuals’ claims itself and ordering the “equitable
relief” (however defined) that ERISA provides for benefits denials.87 Second,
it could issue a formal interpretation of the statutory term “equitable relief,”88
holding that ERISA allows make-whole relief not only for the denied benefits
but also for the injuries resulting from the benefits denial. (Such an
interpretation would, of course, be entitled to judicial deference and would
thereby create a private enforcement mechanism in federal court.89) Third,
DOL could monitor employer-sponsored MCOs’ claims decisions and seek
penalties against abusive firms, without itself providing or ordering any
compensation to harmed patients beyond that which is currently available in
federal court.90 Any of these options would provide a reasonable substitute for
state tort claims against injurious MCO benefits denials.
DOL has, however, done none of these things. The agency has set standards
for claims processing by health benefits plans and has set rules for internal
appeals and external review,91 but it has not created an enforcement
60A AM. JUR. 2D Pensions § 764 (2009) (outlining DOL’s authority and obligations as
ERISA administrator).
86 Between 1995 and 2001, Congress regularly considered legislation to increase DOL’s
regulatory authority, but the legislation, commonly known as the “patients’ bill of rights,”
never made it to the President’s desk. Frances H. Miller, Why Don’t Doctors & Lawyers
(Strangers in the Night) Get Their Act Together?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1295, 1303 (2004).
Some of those regulatory provisions made it into the PPACA, but even without those
changes, the Department’s authority has been sufficiently broad to allow it to regulate
employer-sponsored MCOs. The Department has simply chosen not to engage in the
project.
87 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(5) (2006) (allowing the Secretary of Labor to bring a civil action
against the administrator of an employee benefit plan for an injunction against ERISA
violations or for other equitable relief). See also supra text accompanying notes 52-53
(explaining that individuals have the same access to civil actions as the Secretary under the
terms of the statute, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)).
88 § 1132(a)(5).
89 See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (holding that
an agency’s interpretation of its governing statute is entitled to judicial deference as long as
the statute’s meaning is ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable).
90 ERISA and DOL already require employer-sponsored benefits plans to submit annual
reports with information about their financial and accounting statuses and practices. See 29
U.S.C. § 1132(c) (2006); DOL Administration and Enforcement of ERISA, 29 C.F.R. §
2520.103-1(b) (2010). DOL has authority to impose civil penalties against non-complying
plans. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(2); DOL Administration and Enforcement of ERISA, 29
C.F.R. § 2560.502c-2 (2010). ERISA and DOL do not, however, require any reporting
related to claims processing or claim denials.
91 For pre-PPACA regulations, see 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (2010); Employee Retirement
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mechanism for punishing plan administrators that fail to comply with those
rules.92 Nor has it ever monitored claims denials itself or sought to punish
abusive plans. Although DOL seems aware that claim denials can be a
problem, it has not created a regulatory enforcement scheme to avoid that
problem.
Additionally, although DOL apparently believes that “equitable relief”
ought to be interpreted to allow for make-whole damages, having filed amicus
briefs to that effect93 (a litigating position that is not entitled to deference94), it
has not issued a formal rule advancing that interpretation. At the time of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Davila, therefore, private enforcement was the
only operational mechanism available for punishing a health benefits plan that
refused to honor coverage claims, and the Supreme Court eliminated that
mechanism.
3.

Medical Devices and FDA

For medical devices, the alternative regulator is, of course, the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA). Not only is FDA responsible for ensuring a
device’s safety and efficacy before it goes to market, but also FDA has the
authority to monitor that device’s safety and efficacy once it is on the market.
FDA is then statutorily obliged to withdraw approval from devices that, after
marketing, prove unsafe or ineffective over time.95 Furthermore, FDA obliges

Income Security Act of 1974; Rules and Regulations for Administration and Enforcement,
65 Fed. Reg. 70,246 (Nov. 21, 2000) (codified at 29 C.F.R.§ 2560 (2010)). PPACA set
additional rules for external review and involved HHS in the enforcement of those rules.
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1001(4), 124 Stat.
119 (2010).
92 Indeed, DOL holds that exhaustion of internal appeals to the benefits plan constitutes
exhaustion of administrative remedies for purposes of litigation. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (l)
(2010).
93 See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8-15, Amschwand v.
Spherion Corp., 128 S. Ct. 2995 (2008) (No. 07–841) (signed by the United States Solicitor
General as well as the Department of Labor’s Solicitor, Associate Solicitor, and Counsel for
Appellate and Special Litigation, urging the Supreme Court to grant certiorari); Brief of
Amicus Curiae Elaine L. Chao, Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Labor as Amicus Curiae
supporting Appellee Requesting Affirmance at 20-21, Ferrer, Poirot & Wansbrough PC v.
Bombardier Aerospace Emp. Welfare Plan, 541 U.S. 1072 (2004) (No. 03-10195).
94 Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988) (“We have never
applied [deference rules] to agency litigating positions that are wholly unsupported by
regulations, rulings, or administrative practice.”); see also United States. v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218, 226 (2001) (holding that agency enactments are entitled to deference only if they
carry the “force of law”).
95 See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 319-20 (2008) (“The FDA has the power
to withdraw premarket approval based on newly reported data or existing information and
must withdraw approval if it determines that a device is unsafe or ineffective under the
conditions in its labeling.” (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 360(e)(1), 360h(e) (2006)).
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device manufacturers to report instances of death or injury that may have
resulted from the device’s use and to report instances of device malfunction
that might contribute to death or injury in the future.96
If this regulatory structure operated effectively, the tort system – at least in
its whistleblower and deterrent capacities – might well be unnecessary.
Manufacturers must blow the whistle on their own devices or risk losing their
premarket approval for failure to comply with FDA regulations, and FDA can
(without the aid of punitive damages) prevent the continued sale of unsafe
devices by withdrawing premarket approval.97 Granted, this scheme leaves the
individuals harmed by unsafe devices without compensation for their injuries,
but the point here is only that the plaintiffs’ and courts’ role as regulators is
perhaps unnecessary given FDA’s authority to force whistle-blowing and to
effect deterrence. Furthermore, FDA could almost certainly establish an
administrative hearing process and an administrative remedy to recompense
injured patients without relying on state tort systems.
The problem is that FDA doesn’t actually play these roles with the vigor
required to supplant the tort system and to prevent injuries. Although FDA is
perhaps the best of the four alternative regulators considered here insofar as it
acknowledges post-market regulation as one of its central duties,98 the agency
does not yet have the resources necessary to watch its preapproved devices for
post-market problems and to correct the problems that arise.99 Again,
therefore, the Supreme Court’s opinion seems to leave behind an enforcement
vacuum in which manufacturers can continue to market and sell dangerous
devices with legal impunity.
4.

Medical Error and CMS or Professional Associations

In the story of medical error, there are two alternative regulators that could
enforce quality standards against licensed providers: CMS and state licensure
96 Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360i (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 803.50(a) (2005); 21 C.F.R. §
814.84(b)(2) (2007)).
97 See FDA Premarket Approval of Medical Devices Rule, 21 C.F.R. § 814.46(a)(2)
(2010) (authorizing FDA to withdraw market approval if manufacturer has failed to meet
“any postapproval requirement imposed by . . . regulation”).
98 See, e.g., Richard Platt et al., The New Sentinal Network – Improving the Evidence of
Medical-Product Safety, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 645, 645 (Aug. 13, 2009) (describing
FDA’s new efforts, congressionally authorized in 2007, to use electronic medical records to
monitor medical product safety).
99 See Gostin, supra note 63, at 2314 (describing FDA’s severe “resource deficits” and
observing that those deficits “have resulted in high-profile regulatory failures”); The
Medical Device Safety Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 1346 Before the Subcomm. on Health
of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 14 (2009) (statement of Richard
M. Cooper), http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090512/testimony_cooper.pdf
(admitting, in the context of testimony supporting the Court’s decision, that “better systems
and methods are needed generally to monitor the safety of medical products after they have
been approved”).
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boards. To some extent, CMS has already started playing this role, and
PPACA will strengthen CMS’s hand in quality control in the coming years.
Even prior to PPACA’s passage, CMS had created a “never events” policy, by
which it refuses to reimburse providers that make certain listed errors;100 and it
had instituted a variety of “pay for performance” initiatives, by which it
calibrates hospitals’ and providers’ reimbursement formulae based on evidence
of the providers’ success rates and general quality.101 PPACA requires both
the Medicare and Medicaid programs to expand these and similar policies and
to study their usefulness in quality control.102
State licensure boards also play a quality-controlling role to a certain extent,
revoking licenses from providers that commit egregious violations (such as
practicing the wrong kind of medicine).103
100

See NAT’L QUALITY FORUM, SERIOUS REPORTABLE EVENTS IN HEALTHCARE 2006
UPDATE: A CONSENSUS REPORT 8-16 (2007) (examples of “never events” include surgery
performed on the wrong body part, surgery performed on the wrong patient, and wrong
surgical procedure performed on patient.).
101 See Details for: Medicare “Pay for Performance (P4P)” Initiatives, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SRVS. (Jan. 31, 2005), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/pres
s/release.asp?counter=1343 (describing CMS’s initiatives that link hospital and physician
reimbursement rates to quality measures).
102 PPACA prohibits Medicaid plans from paying for services associated with hospitalacquired conditions (HACs), i.e., complications or co-morbidities contracted by patients
during a hospital stay. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111148, § 2702, 124 Stat. 119, 318-19 (2010). The Secretary is required to identify HACs and
implement appropriate regulations by July 1, 2011. Id. Similarly, PPACA also adjusts
Medicare payments for hospitals to incentivize reductions in HACs. Beginning January 1,
2015, hospitals in the top quartile of all hospitals, relative to the national average of HACs,
will receive ninety-nine percent of applicable Medicare payment at discharge. Id. at § 3008.
Prior to 2015, HHS must provide confidential reports to such hospitals, and inform the
public regarding HACs at such hospitals. Id. This public information must be posted to the
Hospital Compare website. Id. Further, PPACA requires the DHHS to conduct a study on
expanding the HAC payment reduction policy to other facilities that receive Medicare
payments. Id. DHHS must submit this study and associated recommendations to the
Congress by January 1, 2012. Id.
103 See, e.g., MED. BOARD CAL. (last visited Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.medbd.ca.gov/
(“The mission of the Medical Board is to protect health care consumers through the proper
licensing and regulation of physicians and surgeons and certain allied health care
professions and through the vigorous, objective enforcement of the Medical Practice Act,
and, to promote access to quality medical care through the Board’s licensing and regulatory
functions.”); MINN. BOARD MED. PRAC., http://www.state.mn.us/portal/mn/jsp/home.do?age
ncy=BMP (last visited Sept. 16, 2010) (“The mission of the Minnesota Board of Medical
Practice is to protect the public’s health and safety by assuring that the people who practice
medicine or as an allied health professional are competent, ethical practitioners with the
necessary knowledge and skills appropriate to their title and role.”); State Board of Medical
Examiners, N.J. DIV. OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, http://www.state.nj.us/lps/ca/bme/index.html
(last visited Sept. 16, 2010) (“New Jersey’s Medical Board is responsible for protecting the
public’s health and safety by determining qualifications of applicants for licensure,
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Neither CMS nor licensure boards, however, engage in the kind of intensive
quality regulation that the tort system has intended to provide. Uniquely
among these four stories, the central problem here is that the regulators do not
hear or register individual patients’ claims, which for medical malpractice is
necessary not only for individual justice but also for systemic regulation.
Many individual instances of negligence and of resulting iatrogenic injury do
not fall on the categorical list of “never events,” do not constitute evidence of
poor quality under the “pay for performance” program, and are not egregious
enough to provoke license revocation. As a result, even if these programs
worked well as intended (which they might not104), they would not catch or
punish all instances of negligence. The reason for those programmatic gaps is
that many instances of patient injury are extremely hard to judge; for a large
percentage of bad outcomes in healthcare, the causal link between the patient’s
injury and the physician’s care (or lack thereof) is hard to prove and is
dangerous to impute.105 Did the patient get sick after surgery because the
surgeon did something wrong, or just because she got sick, like people do?
We can’t answer that question without looking into the circumstances of the
individual patient.
The strategies, thus, that CMS and licensure boards have developed so far
for deterring negligence – refusing reimbursement, altering reimbursement
formulae, and revoking licenses – would dramatically over-deter negligence if
triggered by every bad outcome. Unfortunately, though, these strategies underdeter negligence in their current form, triggered as they are by limited
categories of bad outcomes (those that could result from nothing but
negligence, such as amputation of the wrong leg) without punishing any
instances of negligence that fall outside of those categories.
B.

Market Failures and Enforcement Vacuums

Of course, the lack of a legal mechanism for enforcement of laws and
contracts does not automatically prove the lack of any mechanism for such
enforcement; markets, including political ones, sometimes suffice to prevent
violations and inefficiencies. In each of the stories presented here, however,
political and private markets systematically fail to achieve optimal deterrence
and regulation. The problem is that healthcare markets are fraught with
information and agency costs that prevent individual voters and consumers
from representing their own interests. Each of these stories thus presents a
vacuum in which actors can violate rules with impunity even despite the
establishing standards for practice, and disciplining licensees who do not adhere to those
requirements.”).
104 See, e.g., Sandra J. Tanenbaum, Pay for Performance in Medicare: Evidentiary Irony
and the Politics of Value, 34 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 717, 717 (2009) (evaluating the pay
for performance initiative and concluding that it does not function as intended but is instead
a useful political tool).
105 Studdert & Mello, supra note 20, at S47-49.
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presence of potential private regulators. In each story, therefore, a public legal
regulator ought to start working to fill the void.
1.

Medicaid

Medicaid, of course, is not subject to many private market pressures.
Although the rise of Medicaid managed care has allowed some private
companies to serve as Medicaid intermediaries and although individual
providers have the option of refusing to serve Medicaid patients (which might
force the program to respond to providers’ interests), the process for setting
reimbursement rates is a decidedly public, political process. We must
therefore look to political markets rather than private markets to restrain
inefficiency.
Unfortunately, however, the political market for Medicaid regulation fails in
two significant ways, both of which arise from its “cooperative federalist”
structure.106 First, because both state and federal lawmakers affect Medicaid
decisions and because the federal requirements that supposedly bind state
decision-makers are so complex, the two levels of government can (and do)
engage in a constant cycle of buck-passing that destroys ordinary mechanisms
of political accountability (a severe information cost).107 Second, because
states have flexibility in setting reimbursement rates, they can engage in some
Tiebout competition108 for the best policy bundles, but in welfare programs

106

Cooperative federalism is the “[d]istribution of power between the federal
government and the states in which each recognizes the power of the other while jointly
engaging in certain governmental functions.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 664 (8th ed.
2004).
107 See Joseph Fastiggi, New York Medicaid: Never Can Say Goodbye, 16 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 581, 609-10 (2007) (lamenting the lack of information made available to
Medicaid recipients regarding “their health and the courses of recommended treatment” and
discussing government administrators’ propensity to shirk responsibility for Medicaid
beneficiaries’ well being); Joshua Tenzer, Reaching the Final Frontiers in Medicaid
Managed Care, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 329, 354-57 (2006) (explaining that states
shirk fiscal responsibility with Medicaid funds while the federal government “push[es] more
responsibility on the states”); Sara Kay Wheeler & Tizgel K.S. High, Medicaid Enforcement
Amidst the Perfect Storm, 9 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 25, 25-26 (2007) (explaining how
the joint regulatory nature of Medicaid forms the “perfect storm,” creating a regulatory
vacuum which neither CMS nor states feel compelled to fix).
108 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416,
418 (1956); see also John D. Donahue, Tiebout? Or Not Tiebout? The Market Metaphor and
America’s Devolution Debate, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 73, 75-77 (1997); Robert P. Inman &
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Rethinking Federalism, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 43, 45-52 (1997);
Moncrieff, supra note 4, at 869 (outlining the basic Tiebout theory); Larry Ribstein & Bruce
Kobayashi, The Economics of Federalism 3-4 (Jan. 2006) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=875626.
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like Medicaid, that competition often results not in optimality but rather in a
“race to the bottom” (an agency cost of a sort).109
Information Costs. The most obvious political check on states’ violations of
federal law is voting. Medicaid decision-makers at the state level are all
politically accountable; they are either state legislators who are directly subject
to electoral incentives or state administrators who answer to an elected
governor.110 If those decision-makers change their Medicaid programs in a
way that violates federal law – and does so to the chagrin of state residents –
those residents can theoretically punish their officials in the next election
cycle.111
But in Medicaid, it is often hard for voters to know whom they should
punish, and gathering accurate information on that score is costly. Because
state Medicaid plans are subject to an extremely large and complicated web of
federal requirements, state decision-makers can blame their unpopular moves
on federal rules (disingenuously, of course, in the relevant case of a move that
violates federal statute). In a mere political marketplace, the lie probably
would not get caught. Information about the web of regulations is too costly to
collect and verify, and individual voters, with their limited influence, act
rationally in remaining ignorant of those regulations.
A more frequent strategy for state decision-makers is to blame the paucity of
their programs on the paucity of federal funding. Because states are budget
constrained, federal funding often determines the generosity of state Medicaid
plans.112 The most common tale from state Medicaid agencies accused of
federal statutory violations, thus, is that they lack the financial resources to do
any better. According to the states, the federal statute requires generous
reimbursements and benefits (perhaps to the point of aspirationalism), but the
federal government refuses to put its money where its mouth is.113 The states’
109 See Scott L. Greer & Peter D. Jacobson, Health Care Reform and Federalism, 35 J.
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 203, 219-21 (2010) (explaining that fiscal competition among
states limits the ability of the states to raise revenue for redistributive health care programs).
110 Susan Dorr Goold et al., Choosing Healthplans All Together: A Deliberative Exercise
for Allocating Limited Health Care Resources, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 563, 594
(2005) (explaining that decisions regarding Medicaid are subject to “the usual methods of
political accountability”).
111 This point presupposes, of course, that the Medicaid violations are politically
unpopular. If such cuts are politically popular, then we need to ask whether the statutory
violation is a problem at all and whether the state should continue to participate in the
Medicaid program at all.
112 Lisa Colosi, Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association: Making the Medicaid
Reimbursement Rate Challenge a Federal Case, 12 PACE L. REV. 139, 142 (1992) (“To
cover the costs of providing medical services to the poor, states primarily rely on federal
contributions . . . .”).
113 In many of the Equal Access Provisions cases that reached the federal appellate level,
the states’ justification for cutting reimbursement rates was purely budgetary. For a list of
such cases, see Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491, 1499 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997); Ark.
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political answer, then, is that Congress and the President, rather than the state
legislature and the Governor, should be punished for Medicaid problems.
The federal government, in its turn, points out that the states demand and
receive a great deal of flexibility in designing their Medicaid programs,
including access to waivers that would allow eligibility or benefit cuts rather
than reimbursement reductions.114 If a particular strategy for reducing the
budget is unpopular, the federal government says, the state should try other
options available for realizing savings. (What the federal government misses,
perhaps strategically, is that any alternative budget-cutting strategy is likely to
be just as unpopular.) Voters again have a hard time judging or verifying the
reality of the situation because information about these programs is costly to
gather, and voters are rationally ignorant of details.115
Med. Soc’y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 531 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting ‘exclusively
budgetary’ justification for rate cuts to Medicaid providers); AMISUB v. Colo. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 879 F.2d 789, 801 (10th Cir. 1989) (rejecting state Medicaid plan that resulted
in forty-six percent reduction in provider reimbursement as being based solely on budgetary
constraints: “While budgetary constraints may be a factor to be considered by a state when
amending a current plan . . . budgetary constraints alone can never be sufficient”). See
generally Moncrieff, supra note 1 (explaining the budgetary strain that Medicaid creates for
states and discussing the cases in which states reduced reimbursement rates in an attempt to
avoid budget overruns).
114 See Frank J. Thompson & Courtney Burke, Executive Federalism and Medicaid
Demonstration Waivers: Implications for Policy and Democratic Process, 32 J. HEALTH
POL. POL’Y & L. 971, 993-95 (2007) (discussing the impact of the Medicaid waiver process
on democratic transparency and legitimacy). Some of this flexibility may diminish with the
Medicaid expansions in PPACA, though, of course, we do not yet know how CMS will
administer the new requirements. PPACA expands Medicaid eligibility to include all
individuals with income at or below 133% of the federal poverty line, who are otherwise
ineligible for Medicaid or Medicare coverage, and also allows for federal matching of state
expenditures associated with expanded enrollment criteria. Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2001(a)(1)(C), 124 Stat. 119, 271 (2010). The
statute requires states to provide this population with “benchmark” or “benchmark
equivalent” benefits by January 1, 2014. Id. at §§ 2001(a)(1)(C), 2001(a)(2)(A). A
benchmark plan is equivalent to federal employees health benefit plan coverage, state
employee coverage, coverage offered by the HMO plan that has the largest insured
commercial, non-Medicaid enrollment in the state, or other DHHS secretary approved
coverage. 42 C.F.R. § 440.330 (2010). PPACA also establishes Federal Medical
Assistance Percentage (FMAP) rate for this category of Medicaid coverage to offset related
state expenditures. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2001(a)(3)(B). From 2014
to 2016, FMAP is 100%, i.e., the federal government will match 100% of states’ funds used
for providing Medicaid coverage to this new category of enrollees. Id. The FMAP is scaled
downward from 2017 onwards, and will be 90% from January 1, 2020. 42 U.S.C.A. §
1396d(y)(1) (West 2010). Additionally, PPACA requires states to provide Medicaid
coverage to former foster children under twenty-six years of age by 2014. Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act § 10201. Previously, this requirement was optional for
states. 42 U.S.C. 1396(a)(10) (2006).
115 Beneficiaries who are harmed by federal violations, of course, act rationally when
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Additionally, even if we assumed that all voters knew whom to blame for
Medicaid policy choices, for the political marketplace to work, a large
percentage of the electorate – beyond just beneficiaries and physicians – would
need to understand and care about Medicaid decision-making enough to vote
against legislators and governors that favored an ungenerous program. Even
assuming that Medicaid was a voting issue for most of the electorate, an
average voter would have a hard time evaluating the wisdom of a given
Medicaid policy choice. Cutting reimbursements might be unquestionably bad
for physicians – and might even be unidirectionally bad for already-covered
beneficiaries – but it might be a good choice if it allows more people to be
covered. Such complicated policy tradeoffs are hard for voters to evaluate
without a lot of information about the policy landscape.
In the end, then, voters have a difficult time apportioning blame between
state and federal governments and have a hard time evaluating Medicaid policy
choices even when they know whom to blame for them. Political
accountability therefore fails as a mechanism for cabining Medicaid abuses.
Agency Costs. The theory of Tiebout competition is that political
subdivisions, such as states, will compete for resident taxpayers by providing
appealing bundles of public goods, public services, and taxes. In other words,
states will set themselves up as good agents of the public interest in order to
attract principals and their concomitant revenue.116 Potential taxpayers will
then sort themselves among those subdivisions according to their preferences
regarding those bundles. Theoretically, this process should result in taxing and
spending policies that optimally reflect the preferences of the states’ residents
(an optimal principal-agent relationship).117
The Tiebout theory fails, however, when the good or service at issue is one
that will attract unappealing residents, such as those that take out of the tax
system more than they put in.118 If the public good or service is one that the
country as a whole would benefit from providing but is one that each state
would benefit from sloughing off onto its neighbors, then the states will
compete to avoid the good or service and its consumers. They will race to the
bottom.

they collect information about statutory violations, so long as the harm of the violation is
sufficiently costly to outweigh the cost of the information. This point is one reason that
litigation – or administrative adjudication – is a useful tool; it allows individuals who have
an incentive to monitor lawfulness to blow a whistle, rather than relying on general voting
populations.
116 Tiebout, supra note 108, at 418; Moncrieff, supra note 4, at 869.
117 Tiebout, supra note 108, at 418.
118 See Jan K. Brueckner, Welfare Reform and the Race to the Bottom: Theory and
Evidence, 66 S. ECON. J. 505 (2000); Craig Volden, The Politics of Competitive Federalism:
A Race-to-the-Bottom in Welfare Benefits?, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 352 (2002) (explaining that
some have argued interjurisdictional competition may lead to an undersupply of welfare
services as jurisdictions cut services to repel undesirable welfare recipients).
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With respect to Medicaid, just such a failure occurs.119 The people that
benefit from Medicaid and that would choose a state with generous Medicaid
spending are, by programmatic definition, poor and sick. They are
overwhelmingly living at or below the Federal Poverty Line; they are taking
Supplemental Security Income; and they are not paying state taxes.120
Medicaid recipients are therefore net losses for state tax systems. While it is
good for the economy of the country as a whole if such people have pre-paid
access to the medical market, no single state wants to attract those people to its
jurisdiction. Tiebout’s interjurisdictional market, therefore, imposes on the
states the opposite incentive of the one that the federal government intended
with the Medicaid Act, and it imposes the opposite incentive of the one that
taxpayer-principals ought collectively (i.e., nation-wide) to prefer. Each state’s
incentive is to make its program as small as possible, at least relative to its
neighbors’ programs, so that Medicaid eligible residents will move out.
It is possible that providers, as resident taxpayers, might counteract that
effect by choosing to leave states with low Medicaid reimbursements in favor
of states with higher Medicaid reimbursements, causing a dearth of practicing
physicians in states with low Medicaid reimbursement rates. But that effect
seems unlikely to correct the problem given that most providers (unlike
Medicaid beneficiaries) do not depend on the Medicaid program and are thus
less likely to uproot themselves to find a better Medicaid system. Providers
generally can make enough money from privately-insured and Medicare
patients to run a good business, allowing them simply to opt out of Medicaid if
reimbursement rates fall too low.
Interstate competition, thus, probably does not provide enough of a check on
state violations of the Medicaid statute. In fact, it may be counter-productive,
incentivizing states to make their Medicaid programs as unappealing to
beneficiaries as possible, regardless of what federal law requires.
2.

Employer Sponsored Insurance

In the case of employer-sponsored insurance (ESI), a robust private market
exists that could, if operating efficiently, cabin abuses on the part of managed
care organizations (MCOs), including abuses in claims processing.121 That
private market has two critical parts: insurance companies competing for
employers and employers competing for labor.122 Unfortunately, both

119 See Greer & Jacobson, supra note 109, at 219; Paul E. Peterson, Devolution’s Price,
14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 111, 118 (1996).
120 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(10) (2006) (listing eligibility groups).
121 See David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the United States –
Origins and Implications, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 82, 82 (2006) (“More than 159 million
Americans – 62.4 percent of the nonelderly population – had health care coverage through
employer-sponsored insurance in 2004.”).
122 See James Maxwell & Peter Temin, Corporate Management of Quality in Employee
Health Plans, 28 HEALTH CARE MGMT. REV. 27, 27 (2000) [hereinafter Corporate
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components of that market suffer from high transaction costs that weaken the
market’s regulatory capacity.123 The first – the insurance market – is fraught
with information costs, preventing individual patients and even large
employers from judging the quality of a given insurance contract. Employers
could bear those information costs with sufficient investment, but they will be
willing to optimize that investment only if they are good agents for their
employees, which (despite the robust labor market) they often are not.124
Information Costs. The market for employer-sponsored health insurance is
undoubtedly a competitive one, with many MCOs and other insurers trying to
sell their products to many employers.125 In the relevant case – in the only
case that is governed by the ERISA shield – the employer does not hire the
MCO to bear the financial risk of its employees’ healthcare losses. ERISA
protects from liability only those employer-sponsored plans that are “selfinsured,” in which the employer is financially responsible for its employees’
healthcare claims. The employer-sponsored MCO, then, is responsible only
for administering benefits, deciding whether a claim is payable or not; it does
not bear any financial risk.
In that market for MCO administration, employers ought to be trying to
maximize value. That is, if employers are good agents for their employees,
they will try to spend as little as possible but as much as necessary to get a
healthcare administrator that operates honestly and well, optimizing the costbenefit trade.126 Part of that value in the case of an MCO (which is charged
Management] (finding that employers have been “conducting intensive price negotiations
with health plans”); see also JAMES MAXWELL ET AL., CORPORATE HEALTH CARE
PURCHASING AMONG THE FORTUNE 500, at 8 (2001) [hereinafter FORTUNE 500] (“Large
companies have a competitive need to attract and retain skilled employees, especially in
today’s tight labor markets.”).
123 See Robert S. Galvin & Suzanne Delbanco, Why Employers Need to Rethink How
They Buy Healthcare, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1549, 1550 (2005) (“Quantitative data are critical to
procurement, yet fewer than half of firms perform financial analysis on their health care
costs, and fewer than a third use hard-dollar ‘return-on-investment’ calculations in their
decisionmaking.”).
124 See, e.g., Corporate Management, supra note 122, at 28 (finding that Fortune 500
employers use a broader definition of health care quality that focuses more on service
quality and less on clinical quality).
125 See James Maxwell et al., Corporate Health Care Purchasing and the Revised Social
Contract with Workers, 39 BUS. & SOC’Y 281, 287 (2000) [hereinafter Revised Social
Contract] (“Consumers (employees) keep down the cost of health care by forcing health
plans to compete among themselves, just as the producers of other goods and services do.”).
126 See Galvin & Delbanco, supra note 123, at 1549 (arguing that employers’ economic
interest and expertise in supply-management chain “should result in employers’ using their
procurement expertise to increase the value of their health care expenditures”); Pamela B.
Peele et al., Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance: Are Employers Good Agents for Their
Employees?, 78 MILBANK Q. 5, 7 (2000) (hypothesizing that if employers are good agents,
they will “understand[] their employees’ health plan preferences” and “establish
mechanisms for . . . providing useful information to their employees about their health
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with determining eligibility for benefits on a case-by-case basis under “medical
necessity” review) would undoubtedly be the MCO’s claims processing habits.
An MCO that habitually denies valid claims – maliciously or negligently
deeming them medically unnecessary127 – ought to fail in the competitive ESI
market.128
But in order to determine whether an MCO is abusive or arbitrary in claims
processing, one needs to aggregate information across patients and over time;
individual complaints or stories are insufficient to draw conclusions.129
Because we want MCOs to deny claims for medical services that are
unnecessary and because both doctors and patients have incentives to overconsume medical care,130 we cannot deem every denial of benefits about which
a patient or doctor complains to be negligent or abusive. Furthermore, because
causation is difficult to prove, we cannot impute MCO malice or negligence
from a patient’s bad outcome. Only by examining trends in claims processing
can an MCO consumer determine whether the insurer has a bad or abusive
habit of denying claims. Part of the value of the ESI system, then, is that
employers (and other large-group purchasers) are well-positioned to aggregate
information across employees and over time.131 Unlike individual consumers,
large-group purchasers have the capacity to become well-informed consumers
in the MCO market.132
insurance offerings”); WATSON WYATT WORLDWIDE, 12TH ANNUAL NATIONAL BUSINESS
GROUP ON HEALTH/WATSON WYATT SURVEY REPORT 2 (2007), available at http://www.corp
syn.net/Special/images/SPC_090607_WatsonWyatt.pdf (declaring that “best-performing
companies” have significantly lower annual expenditure increases for their health care
programs).
127 One reason that the ERISA shield applies only to self-insured employer plans – i.e.,
plans under which employers directly bear the risk of their employees’ healthcare losses – is
that the MCO that processes claims in the relevant case does not have a financial incentive
to deny claims. Because the MCO’s finding that a claim is “medically necessary” and
therefore valid will cause the employer rather than the MCO to lose money, the likelihood
of malicious denial is relatively low in the relevant case, as compared to the non-relevant
case of a fully insured employer.
128 See Stephen Blakely, The Backlash Against Managed Care, NATION’S BUS. At 16
(July 1998), available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1154/is_n7_v86/ai_
20797610/?tag=content;col1 (describing patients’ growing discontent with managed care).
129 See Peele et al., supra note 126, at 15-16 (finding that employees were hesitant about
making plan choices on their own and felt that employers “were much better equipped to
sort through the plans and options than they were individually”).
130 For a thorough review of health care consumer and provider incentives, see generally
CHARLES E. PHELPS, HEALTH ECONOMICS (Addison Wesley 3d ed. 2002).
131 Peele et al., supra note 126, at 15-16.
132 See Corporate Management, supra note 122, at 38 (stating that Fortune 500
companies “routinely collect large amounts of data and use them in their purchasing
decisions”). This distinction is, incidentally, part of why the individual market for MCOs
fails so completely, and it is a good reason for maintaining private actions against MCOs
that are not employer-sponsored.

2354

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90: 2323

But such information aggregation is expensive. Employers would need to
establish reporting mechanisms so that they would know when claims were
denied, and they would need to analyze trends in claims denials. Employers
would also need to investigate causation – a tricky question in any medical
case – when a denial correlated to an injury, in order to determine whether the
MCO should have known ex ante that denying the claim would likely cause
harm.
The good news is that employers do play this role to some extent.133
Particularly large corporate purchasers are aware of quality differentials among
MCOs, and many large employers do have reporting systems in place that
allow their employees to file complaints when their claims are denied. The
bad news is that employers probably do not monitor MCOs sufficiently to
eliminate abuses or even to optimize regulation, even though it would certainly
be in their employees’ interests for them to avoid bad MCOs.134
Agency Costs. The natural next question is whether we have any reason to
believe that employers are investing less in this information than their
employees would choose to invest if they were deciding for themselves. In
other words, is there agency slack between employers and employees that
results in sub-optimal investment, relative to employees’ preferences? And the
answer is probably yes.
The cost of employees’ health insurance premiums comes out of employees’
wages, not shareholders’ profits.135 As a result, when it comes to spending on
insurance premiums, employers should be willing to spend any amount that
their employees are willing to spend. That is, employers have no incentive to
under-invest in premiums relative to their employees’ preferences. But the
administrative cost of monitoring a health insurance company and the
administrative cost of punishing insurers for abuses might be a different story;
those costs might be much harder to pass on to employees in the form of
decreased wages. Although there is evidence that employees will choose an
133 See, e.g., Blumenthal, supra note 121, at 86 (“Pressed by rising costs, private
employers have pushed insurance companies to develop new approaches to organizing and
financing care that they hope will limit expenses without alienating their employees.”);
Galvin & Deblanco, supra note 123, at 1550 (“[A] minority [of employers] factor quality
information into health plan selection and contracting.”); James Maxwell et al., Corporate
Health Care Purchasing Among Fortune 500 Firms, 20 HEALTH AFF. 181, 186 (2001)
[hereinafter Corporate Health Care Purchasing] (“The study documents relatively
widespread awareness of quality measurement among the Fortune 500, with companies
reporting the routine collection of large amounts of quality related data.”).
134 See, e.g., Galvin & Delbanco, supra note 123, at 1550 (arguing that employers do not
focus enough resources or the right resources for employees’ ESI plans).
135 See, e.g., Blumenthal, supra note 121, at 85 (“This dynamic leads economists to argue
that ultimately employers pass the costs of health care on to workers who pay for their own
health insurance in the form of wages or others benefits foregone.”); Peele et al., supra note
126, at 5 (“Economists argue that employees effectively pay for most of their nonwage
benefits through lower wages.”).
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employer based on general generosity of the benefits package,136 it is much
less likely that employees will choose an employer based on a specific MCO’s
quality or based on the employer’s efforts to ensure MCO quality. Those
things are simply harder for prospective employees to see and measure than the
general scope of the benefits package and the premiums paid for insurance,
particularly given that prospective employees lack the aggregate information
needed to judge MCO quality.
Even in a competitive labor market, therefore, the employer might not have
much of an incentive to invest in information about MCO quality in order to
compete for good labor, and the employer might not be able to charge its
employees for the service of aggregating information if it chooses to do so on
the employees’ behalf. The employer’s incentive might, therefore, be to do
what’s cheapest, not what’s best.137
The bottom line here is that employers have the capacity to “regulate” MCO
abuses through market competition, and they do play that role to some extent.
But employers’ abilities are limited by the information costs of monitoring
MCO behavior and by the failures in the agency relationship between
employers and their employees.
3.

Medical Devices

As with ESI, there are several competitive markets operating in the medical
device story that might cabin manufacturers’ ability to sell unsafe products.
First, manufacturers must sell their products to doctors and hospitals, both of
which have incentives to provide good care in order to attract insurance
contracts and patients. Second, manufacturers must convince public and
private insurance companies to cover their new technologies, and those
insurers have incentives to avoid costly injuries to their patients. Those
markets, however, fail in ways essentially identical to the ESI markets, with
the providers, hospitals, and insurance companies serving as the agents
positioned to aggregate information about device quality.
Information Costs. As with MCOs, devices are hard to judge based on
individual stories. In any given case, a patient’s bad outcome might not have
been the device’s fault at all. And even when the device clearly malfunctions,
its failure might have been the doctor’s fault or simply a single bad device
whose malfunction will not be replicated. In order to draw the conclusion that
a device is generally unsafe or ineffective, one needs to see a trend of harmful
malfunctions or a trend of unsatisfactory patient outcomes. Individual patients,
of course, cannot easily see those trends when deciding whether to use a
particular device. In fact, at the point of purchase, individual consumers are
not likely to have any basis for judging the device’s safety; consumers have not
136

FORTUNE 500, supra note 122, at 9 (“Health benefits were viewed as contributing
most to employee attraction . . . .”).
137 Corporate Health Care Purchasing, supra note 133, at 186 (suggesting that
employers care more about driving down cost than quality of care).
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yet had any experience with the device themselves, and few will have had
exposure to other patients who have used the device.
Fortunately, doctors, hospitals, and insurance companies are (at least
somewhat) well-positioned to see such trends. Not only does each individual
doctor gain experience with a given device as she uses it across patients, but
also each hospital and insurer can see the device’s utility and success across
doctors. If a device is unsafe or ineffective, doctors and hospitals can simply
stop buying it and stop using it on their patients, regardless of whether the
device retains FDA approval or not, and insurance companies can refuse to
reimburse for such devices.
As in the ESI case, though, this process of aggregating information and
learning from emerging trends is not free. Doctors, hospitals, and insurance
companies would need to establish mechanisms for monitoring device
malfunctions and bad outcomes, and they would need to analyze the individual
cases of malfunction to ensure that those cases were actually attributable to the
device rather than to the doctor or patient. Although the benefits of that
information for patients might be quite high, there is no doubt that the
information is extremely costly.
Agency Costs. The question, then (as in the employer case), is whether the
actors that are positioned to aggregate information have the right balance of
incentives to optimize their investment. Will they invest the same amount that
their patients collectively would choose to invest in gathering information
about device quality? And the answer, once again, is probably not. Most of
the costs of malfunctioning devices are borne by patients, not doctors,
hospitals, or insurers,138 so that the agents in this case do not internalize the full
cost to their principals.
Perhaps counter-intuitively, doctors and hospitals might be worse agents for
their patients in this case than insurers. Although the Hippocratic Oath and the
markets for doctors and hospitals prevent egregious abuses, all providers have
incentives to provide as much care as they can, especially if they are
reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis (as most doctors still are).139 Even if not
on fee-for-service, providers have incentives to provide the care that brings
them the highest possible profits. Doctors and hospitals, thus, might want to
continue using risky devices for as long as possible in order to bill for the extra
intervention, and they might therefore want to avoid information about the
devices’ malfunctions.

138

See James T. O’Reilly, Pin the Tail on the Other Donkey: Allocating and Avoiding
Injury Losses After Drug or Device Approval, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 559, 571 (2007) (“No
one looks forward to being an injured plaintiff, no one aspires to be the subject of Form
FDA-3500 adverse experience reports, so the loss from medical and product error stays with
the least effective lobbying force, the patients.”).
139 INST. OF MED., REWARDING PROVIDER PERFORMANCE: ALIGNING INCENTIVES IN
MEDICARE 4 (2006) (suggesting that fee-for-service pay structures encourages over use and
thus higher costs and substandard care).
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To take the point to a macabre extreme that one hopes and expects to be
rare: doctors and hospitals in the current system actually get paid more for
injuring their patients than for curing them. If doctors or hospitals use a device
that malfunctions, they get paid for the initial intervention as well as for any
interventions that become necessary to fix resulting injuries (excepting
reimbursement for the consequences of “never events” from payers with such
policies140). Even after discovering new evidence of a device’s risks,
therefore, an unscrupulous doctor might continue to use it.
Insurers’ incentives, by contrast, at least follow the same vector as their
patients’ incentives because the insurers often get stuck with higher costs when
their patients get injured. Unlike doctors, insurers lose money as the number
of interventions increases; they pay for initial and post-injury interventions on
behalf of the patients they cover. As a result, insurers might want to set
incentives for doctors and patients to avoid using risky devices, such as by
refusing to cover certain technologies or by setting strict guidelines for
coverable uses of such technologies, in order to avoid paying consequential
claims when devices malfunction. Insurers, thus, might well have the right
incentives to monitor device malfunction and to tinker with the private market
for device purchase and use, effectively punishing sloppy manufacturers by
shrinking their market.
Unfortunately, though, most insurers (indeed, all insurers but Medicare) do
not keep their patients long enough to suffer the full cost of disabling injuries.
If a device malfunctions in a way that causes a lifelong disability, the insurance
company will bear the cost of treatment only until the patient qualifies for
public insurance, at sixty-five or at a point of coverable disability (whichever
comes first).141 Even if an injury is not fully disabling, private insurers often
find ways to terminate coverage rather than bearing consequential costs.142 For
example, insurers (prior to PPACA) have placed caps on yearly and lifelong
claims, and some have habitually terminated contracts when patients started
consuming too much medical care. Insurers have also refused coverage for
preexisting conditions – including lasting effects of prior injuries – such that an
insured might lose coverage for the injury when he or she changes jobs or
otherwise switches insurance. PPACA addresses all of these problems to one
degree or another, though it might allow plans to terminate contracts in some
cases.143
140

See supra Part II.A.4.
Who Is Eligible for Medicare?, MEDICARE, http://questions.medicare.gov/app/
answers/detail/a_id/10/kw/eligibility (last updated June 10, 2009).
142 See Largest U.S. Health Insurer Rewarded Employees That Cancelled Coverage Of
Sick Patients – Consumer Watchdog Calls on Congress to Ban Bonuses for Canceling,
Delaying or Denying Medical Care, CONSUMERWATCHDOG.ORG (June 16, 2009), http://ww
w.consumerwatchdog.org/patients/articles/?storyId=27969.
143 PPACA prohibits all group health plans from establishing lifetime limits from
September 23, 2010 onwards or January 1, 2011 for calendar year plans. Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10101(a), 124 Stat. 119, 883-84 (2010).
141
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In the end, then, insurers’ incentive might be better aligned with patients’
interests, but because insurers often avoid the full costs of exposure to
dangerous devices, they do not have a full incentive to avoid those costs.
Insurers might, therefore, gather some information about devices and refuse
coverage to the worst ones, but their investment in the regulatory project will
likely fall short of what rational patients would be willing to spend to avoid
bad devices.
Of course, patients usually get to choose their doctors, hospitals, and
insurance companies, so maybe patients could use competition within these
groups to encourage monitoring. In other words, patients could give more
business to doctors, hospitals, and insurers that invest correctly in monitoring
device malfunction. But as in the case of ESI, patients are ill-positioned to
enforce their preferences through their agents because patients lack the
information necessary to hold their agents accountable. Again, an individual
patient who has a bad experience with a medical device does not have a
credible story to tell about the device’s general safety or efficacy, which
prevents patients from determining whether the doctors’, hospitals’, and
insurers’ purchasing decisions are good or not. Should the doctor have known
that the device was risky and refused to provide it? Or was the patient’s bad
experience a rare or even unique event – a fluke?
Even if patients incapable of judging individual devices knew that they
should prefer insurance companies that actively monitor device safety and
efficacy, it is not clear that they could determine which insurance companies
were doing so – or at least which companies were doing so well. First,
insurance contracts are so long and complicated that it would be hard to
discover which devices were and were not covered, and second, even if a
consumer had clear lists of covered devices for various competing insurance
contracts, it would be impossible to distinguish between good and bad lists

Plans may not set annual limits from 2014 onwards. Id. Prior to 2014, however, plans may
only establish restricted annual limits as defined by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, to assure access to needed services with minimal impact on premiums. Id. With
respect to benefits that are not “essential health benefits . . . a plan or issuer may impose
annual or lifetime per-individual dollar limits on specific covered benefits.” Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act: Preexisting Condition Exclusions, Lifetime and Annual
Limits, Rescissions, and Patient Protections, 75 Fed. Reg. 37,191 (June 28, 2010) (to be
codified at 26 C.F.R. 54.9815–2711T, 29 C.F.R. 2590.715–2711, 45 C.F.R. 147.126).
Finally, the PPACA forbids plans from rescinding coverage, except in case of fraud or
misrepresentation. Id. at 37,192. PPACA also prohibits group and individual health plans
from denying coverage based on an applicant’s preexisting condition. Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, § 2704, 124 Stat. at 154-55. Although this prohibition is generally
effective for plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2014, it became effective for plan
years beginning on or after September 23, 2010 for enrollees who are under nineteen.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Preexisting Condition Exclusions, Lifetime and
Annual Limits, Rescissions, and Patient Protections, 75 Fed. Reg. at 37,189-90.
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(good and bad contracts) without knowing which devices should be covered.
Again, that information is awfully hard for an individual consumer to gain.
In the case of medical devices, then, the private market actors that are best
situated to gather information about unsafe and ineffective devices probably do
not have sufficient incentive to bear the considerable cost of doing so. Even as
agents for their patients, their incentives are not aligned because there is too
much agency slack. The market, thus, does not adequately protect patients
from unsafe and ineffective devices.
4.

Medical Error

As in the prior cases, there is a private market that could cabin medical
negligence, but as in the prior cases, that market fails due to high information
and agency costs. In this story, doctors compete for insurance contracts
(meaning that they compete for “preferred provider” status with large
insurance companies),144 and they compete for individual patients. (Some
doctors choose not to compete for the insurance status and throw their fates to
the individual patients’ choices; others compete for insurance status and then
compete for patients within those insurer pools.) But there are failures in the
medical malpractice case that are again virtually identical to the failures in ESI
and devices: individual experience is insufficient to draw conclusions about
doctor quality, and the actors positioned to aggregate information – the
insurers, in this case – are poor agents for their patients.
Information Costs. As in the prior stories, the primary information cost here
is the need for aggregate data. With respect to provider quality, one cannot
draw reliable conclusions about an individual provider without knowing
something about the provider’s overall injury and error rates. All doctors make
some mistakes, and many patients have bad outcomes through no fault of their
provider’s. But the information cost is actually a bit higher here than in the
prior cases. Even comprehensive data about a provider’s morbidity and
mortality rates would not tell us enough about that provider’s quality because
we would need to risk adjust those statistics – to account for the possibility that
the individual provider habitually treats sicker, riskier patients who are simply
more likely to experience bad outcomes. That is, unlike with devices that
regularly malfunction or MCOs that regularly deny claims, we cannot
confidently conclude that a doctor that regularly fails to save her patients’ lives
is a malfunctioning or abusive doctor. We need to account for the possibility
that any doctor treating the particular patients at issue would have had the same
mortality rate because those patients were simply beyond medical help.145
144 This point holds less true in states with “any willing provider” laws, which require
MCOs to enlist any provider that wants to participate in the MCO’s “preferred provider”
network, but even under those laws MCOs can place conditions on participating providers,
presumably including quality controls.
145 For an example of risk-adjusted morbidity and mortality rates, see David Emmons,
Data on Employee Physician Profiling, 26 AM. HOSP. ASS’N J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 73
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Such risk adjustment requires conclusions about causation that cannot be
reached without close, expert analysis of individual outcomes. Clearly, that
task would outstrip an individual patient’s capacity, even if the patient had
access to lots of data.
Of course, one good reason to buy an MCO, such as a preferred provider
organization, is to delegate the task of choosing doctors to an insurance
company, which has better capacity to aggregate and analyze information.
Insurance companies have good access to data about doctors’ successes across
patients, reasonable access to data about individual patients’ risk factors, and
excellent infrastructural capacity to gauge risk in the form of actuarial
departments. Perhaps, then, the private market could work to regulate doctor
error if MCOs would engage in intensive quality controls, such as refusing
reimbursement to – or cutting reimbursements for – doctors that have high
error rates and whose errors seem attributable to doctor failure rather than
patient risk. As previously noted, CMS is leading the way on just such a
project with its “pay for performance” and “never events” initiatives, and many
private insurers have begun to adopt these programs.146
That said, if insurers were truly to supplant medical malpractice as a
regulatory mechanism, their reimbursement and other quality control programs
would need to be rigorous and precise. Insurers would need to be careful to
deny payment for avoidable errors while continuing to pay for unavoidable
ones and to refuse contracts to sloppy doctors while continuing to contract with
doctors that take on high-risk patients. As in the prior stories, such a system is
possible but costly to implement and execute.147
(1993) (outlining physician profiles created by the New York Department of Health).
146 See Meredith B. Rosenthal et al., Early Experience With Pay-for-Performance: From
Concept to Practice, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1788, 1788, 1792-93 (2005) (noting the
growing adoption of pay-for-performance programs among private payers but concluding
that the programs do little to increase provider quality); Devin S. Schindler, Never Events,
Defensive Medicine and the Continued Federalization of Malpractice, 12 QUINNIPIAC
HEALTH L.J. 209, 213-14 (2008-2009) (discussing CMS’ advent of “never-events” and the
growing trend that doctors and hospitals are not reimbursed for provider-induced injuries);
Maura Lerner, Minnesota Is First State With Policy to Stop Billing After Medical Errors,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Sept. 19, 2007, http://www.startribune.com/local/11590
481.html (describing how Minnesota hospitals decided to stop charging for follow-up care
caused by their own mistakes); Stephen Smith, Medical Mistakes No Longer Billable: Bold
Steps Taken to Reduce Hospital Errors, BOSTON GLOBE, June 19, 2008,
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2008/06/19/medical_mistakes_no_longer_billabl
e/. See generally Kristin Madison, The Law and Policy of Health Care Quality Reporting,
31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 215 (2009) (discussing payers’ use of quality “report cards” as a
possible means of improving provider quality).
147 And, as noted, the systems that are in place so far do not seem to be working very
well. See, e.g., Rosenthal et al., supra note 146, at 1792-93 (concluding that current private
insurers’ quality improvement programs do not work well for some kinds of providers);
Tanenbaum, supra note 104, at 722-40 (reviewing empirical studies of pay-for-performance
initiatives in CMS and private insurers and concluding that they generally have not effected
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Agency Costs. Consumers, of course, might be willing to bear the cost of
such a system if it prevented patient injury, and if that were the case, then
insurance companies would theoretically be able to pass the cost of their
monitoring systems on to their patients in the form of higher premiums. There
are two problems, though, that stymie this possible market innovation. First,
patients would have a hard time evaluating the MCOs’ efforts and might
therefore get hoodwinked into paying more for an MCO that doesn’t actually
regulate quality well. As noted in the ESI and device stories, MCO habits are
hard to monitor, even for large group purchasers with lots of market power.148
Second, patients might irrationally undervalue such a system out of optimism
bias (either because every patient thinks she is unlikely to get sick or because
every patient thinks her doctor is better than average).149 Once again, then,
agency costs in the form of information asymmetry come into play; patients
lack necessary information to demand and evaluate this service.
Nor do insurance companies’ incentives align with their patients’ incentives
sufficiently for the insurance companies to play a paternalistic role, monitoring
doctor quality absent patient insistence and forcing patients to accept resulting
costs. Insurers’ incentives are somewhat aligned with their patients’, of
course, since insurers suffer some costs from doctor error if they wind up
paying for post-injury care. But, as in the device case, insurers often avoid
such costs by terminating coverage or by shifting patients to other payers.150
Furthermore, even if insurance companies could never avoid paying for postinjury care, they still would not have a full incentive to avoid patient injuries
because the most the insurance company has to pay is the medical cost of
treating the iatrogenic injury. Insurers internalize less than the full monetary
cost since they do not pay for lost productivity, and they internalize none of the
non-monetary cost (like pain).151
The insurance company thus does not have a full incentive to protect its
patients from bad doctors. Patients themselves are not good at evaluating
insurance companies’ relevant policies because they are not good at judging
doctor quality and because they are not easily capable of perceiving MCO
habits. Even if the market for health insurance were perfectly competitive,
therefore, there still would be agency slack between insurers and patients.
quality improvements).
148 See supra Parts II.B.2 & II.B.3. Furthermore, the agency slack between employers
and employees, see supra Part II.B.2, might cause employers to under-invest in information
about MCO quality controls.
149 See generally Neil D. Weinstein & William M. Klein, Resistance of Personal Risk
Perceptions to De-biasing Interventions, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 313 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002)
(describing the persistence of optimism bias in patients’ judgments of their own health
risks).
150 See supra Part II.B.3.
151 See generally INST. OF MED., supra note 11 (describing and quantifying the many
costs of iatrogenic injury).
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In the end, then, the private market, even with MCOs as agents for their
patients, does not suffice to regulate doctor quality. Individual patients are bad
at evaluating individual doctors, and they are bad at evaluating MCO qualitycontrol programs.
***
Note that the four markets considered here – and, in fact, most if not all
healthcare markets – suffer from the same two sets of transaction costs:
information costs and agency costs. Indeed, we can be more precise. In the
three private market cases, the informational problem has two components: (1)
a need for aggregation of information across patients and doctors, and (2) a
need for critical (and difficult) evaluation of causation in individual cases. The
agency costs also have two components in all four cases: (1) an asymmetry of
information between patients and their agents, and (2) a misalignment of
incentives between patients and their agents (or a failure of agents to
internalize their principals’ full costs). In all four cases, these information and
agency costs cause healthcare markets to fail, necessitating regulatory
intervention.
III. FROM STATE JUDICIAL TO FEDERAL EXECUTIVE ENFORCEMENT
Given that healthcare markets require legal regulation to operate efficiently,
we ought now to ask the comparative institutional competence question:
Which legal entity is best situated to correct healthcare’s information and
agency costs? The Supreme Court’s and state legislatures’ decisions to
eliminate private enforcement suggest part of the answer: not state courts. And
the presence of the alternative regulators suggests the other part of the answer:
federal agencies. In all four of the stories considered here, the assault on
litigation and the presence of federal regulatory alternatives present an
opportunity. Without much statutory change or congressional action, we can
fill our enforcement vacuums by embracing the trend from state judicial to
federal executive regulation, further empowering the federal executive to fulfill
its regulatory role.
Importantly, the point here is not that executive agencies are already doing a
good job at regulating. In fact, our experience with federal executive
regulation so far might well give readers pause in accepting my suggestions
here. But the central thesis of this Article is that a regulator that can operate
nation-wide through ex ante regulation has greater institutional capacity to
address healthcare’s particular market failures than any regulator that must
operate case-by-case through ex post evaluation. That simple theoretical point,
which seems uncontroversial in itself, strongly suggests that we should invest
in strengthening our federal executive system of healthcare regulation rather
than reverting to our state judicial system.
This Part fleshes out the reallocation trend as it arises in our four stories and
considers the advantages and disadvantages of the shift for Medicaid, ESI,
devices, and medical malpractice.
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A. The Reallocation Trend
The migration of regulatory authority from judicial to executive forums is
quite clear in our four stories; in all four, the problem is that private litigation
(i.e., judicial action) is no longer available, and in all four, one apparent
solution is to let the alternative regulators (executive entities) supplant private
litigation. The migration of authority from state to federal forums is clear in
two of our stories and real (though less clear) in the other two; the device and
ESI cases, premised as they are on federal preemption of state law, present
clean shifts of authority from state to federal forums, while the Medicaid and
medical malpractice cases represent more muddled shifts in the general
direction of federal forums.
1.

Separation of Powers

In limiting private enforcement, the Supreme Court and state legislatures
also effectively limit judicial enforcement. The point may be obvious, but:
Without individual lawsuits, the judiciary is powerless to make or alter
healthcare regulations. The judicial branch’s regulatory power – in common
law systems by creating rules and in statutory regimes by interpreting them – is
always contingent on case-by-case adjudication, the resolution of private
litigation. And in all four cases considered here, private litigation has
disappeared in favor of executive enforcement through rulemaking. Courts can
no longer hear any challenges to Medicaid compliance, any claims for
consequential or punitive damages against abusive employer-sponsored
MCOs, any allegations of dangerousness against preapproved medical devices,
or any large claims for noneconomic or punitive damages against negligent
providers.
That said, the elimination of private causes of action – if we shift from pure
litigation to executive enforcement – does not completely obliterate the
judiciary’s role in the regulatory regime. First, administrative agencies’ rules,
regulations, and interpretations are subject to Article III review for both
procedural and substantive compliance.152 Second, in the four cases
considered here, as Part III.B will argue, the relevant agencies would be well
advised to establish adjudicatory processes for individual claims, which would
allow for private, individual challenges to executive decision-making as well
as private claims for compensation. The agencies’ resolution of such claims
would then also be subject to Article III review.
The judiciary will therefore retain some role in these four regulatory regimes
even if the executive fully displaces private litigation as the regulatory
mechanism, but the judiciary’s role will be different and lesser. Courts will
owe deference to many of the agency rules and adjudications that reach Article
152

See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 89-554, §§ 701-706, 80 Stat.
392, 392 (1966) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2008)); Chevron v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“Such legislative regulations are given controlling
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”).
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III review,153 and many of the quotidian regulatory decisions that might have
belonged to the judiciary in the past will never reach the courts, having been
sufficiently settled through administrative processes. The judiciary will
therefore retain a role as a mediator of executive regulation, but it will not be a
creator of regulatory rules.
The judiciary, thus, has largely ceded to the executive the power to enforce
federal Medicaid rules, ESI contracts, and medical device safety, and the state
legislatures have largely shifted the power to enforce medical malpractice
standards out of the judiciary.
2.

Federalism

The federalist shift is obvious for ESI and medical devices, though less so
for Medicaid and medical malpractice. In the regulatory regimes for ESI and
medical devices, private enforcement mechanisms have disappeared only
because the Supreme Court held that federal law preempts state law (even
where federal law fails to provide its own private right of action). Davila and
Riegel prohibit states from setting rules for MCO negligence and for products
liability, leaving that responsibility entirely with the federal government, with
only ERISA and the FDCA – federal statutes – available for constraining MCO
and manufacturer abuses.
In Medicaid, the entity responsible for enforcing the statute prior to
Gonzaga was usually a federal entity; federal courts could have heard (and
heard most if not all of) the § 1983 suits against state Medicaid agencies.154
Regulatory authority itself, therefore, did not as clearly shift away from state
governments in the Medicaid story since state courts were never solely
responsible for enforcing the statute. But the effect of Gonzaga has been to
absolve state agencies from liability or responsibility for their violations of the
federal statute and to shift responsibility for the statute’s enforcement entirely
to the federal agency, CMS. The story therefore represents a shift of
responsibility from state to federal entities, just not the same shift of active
regulatory oversight that is at issue in the ESI and device cases.
In medical malpractice, the state legislatures have disarmed their own
common law systems without proactively encouraging the federal government
to step in. The effect, however, has been to leave CMS, through its
reimbursement formulae, primarily responsible for ensuring provider quality.
Furthermore, the states’ actions in the medical malpractice arena have
accomplished little if anything in terms of improving provider quality, which
has emboldened Congress to step in with federal medical malpractice reform
153

See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
See Donenberg, supra note 18, at 1520 n.131 (citing Pa. Pharmacists Ass’n v.
Houston, 283 F.3d 531, 543-44 (3d Cir. 2002); Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v.
Hood, 235 F.3d 908, 927-28 (5th Cir. 2000); Visiting Nurse Ass’n v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997,
1004 n.7 (1st Cir. 1996); Ark Med. Soc’y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 528 (8th Cir.
1993)).
154
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proposals.155 The legislative caps have therefore effected a shift in
governance, though probably unintentionally and certainly indirectly.
In all four stories, therefore, the federal government has taken over large
swaths of regulatory responsibility from the states.
B.

Advantages and Disadvantage of the Shift

The best regulatory forum in each of these cases will be the one that is best
situated to address and correct the information and agency costs that confound
healthcare markets. In all four stories considered here – and probably in most
healthcare contexts – federal executive forums have significant advantages
over state judicial forums in the project of correcting information and agency
costs. Most importantly, federal agencies will be significantly better than state
courts at aggregating and evaluating information. That said, state judicial
forums might retain some advantage in correcting agency costs, and any future
design changes to administrative regulation ought to try to minimize the
regulators’ agency failures.
1.

Information Costs

Federal executive forums bring two significant advantages to the project of
gathering and evaluating information: expertise and scale. As Part II.B made
clear, the biggest informational problem in healthcare markets is the need to
aggregate data. This need arises primarily from causal uncertainty that
pervades healthcare stories; in an individual case, we can rarely determine with
confidence the cause of a patient’s bad outcome. It might have been provider
sloppiness, device malfunction, or MCO abuse, or it might have been simply
that the patient was sick and didn’t get better. Distinguishing among possible
causes requires a high level of medical expertise.
That expertise, then, is the first advantage of executive forums over judicial
forums. If DOL took over ESI regulation, the department created for
evaluating MCO claims processing would, over time, become expert in the
project, as DOL staffers would develop skill at identifying abusive claim
denials. The same would be true for an FDA department devoted to
monitoring devices and a CMS department devoted to evaluating provider
quality: the staff of those departments presumably would come in with some
expertise and would develop even greater expertise over time. This
institutional learning contrasts starkly with lay juries that have been charged,
one panel at a time, with evaluating plaintiffs’ individual claims. Even if
expert testimony worked flawlessly to inform lay jurors,156 the jurors’
evaluations of that testimony would be less sophisticated and more error-prone
155

Moncrieff, supra note 4, at 857-58 (describing congressional and presidential interest
in medical malpractice reform).
156 Which it certainly doesn’t seem to do. See Christopher T. Robertson, Blind Expertise,
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 177-78 (2010) (discussing how biased expert witnesses deprive
factfinders of a clear view of the facts, leading to wrong decisions).
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than expert bureaucrats’ own evaluations of individual cases, especially
because the adversarial process encourages countervailing testimony that
jurors might have a particularly hard time judging.
Of course, even when experts are charged with evaluating individual
outcomes, their conclusions are limited to individual cases and might still be
error-prone. From a single story of device malfunction, the most expert of
experts may not be able to conclude with confidence that the device was
responsible for the injury, and the expert certainly would hesitate to conclude
from a single story that a device is generally unsafe and should be recalled or
relabeled. Likewise for a single story of provider negligence, from which we
might not be able to conclude that the provider was solely to blame for the
injury and from which we ought not to conclude that the provider is generally
sloppy and should be punished; and likewise for a single story of wrongful
benefits denial, from which we might not be able to conclude that the MCO
was to blame and ought not to conclude that the MCO is generally abusive and
should be put out of business.157 In order to draw final conclusions, we need to
gather several stories – to aggregate data. That process of gathering large
swaths of data allows evaluation of trends and also helps to smooth error that
might occur in expert evaluations of individual cases. Indeed, the final
evaluation drawn from a body of data becomes increasingly likely to be correct
as the body of data grows, as long as the evaluating experts that produce the
data are (on average) better than random in their individual evaluations.158
Hence the second advantage of federal executive forums (and the true
advantage of federal over state forums): scale. It would be theoretically
possible, of course, for a state court to watch for repeat offenders – for MCOs,
devices, and providers that get sued often – and perhaps to assign high punitive
damages to those repeat offenders in an effort to put them out of business. But
an individual state court has limited jurisdiction and does not communicate all
that well with other jurisdictions.159 A court’s ability to aggregate information
157 Admittedly, the tort system does not generally draw such wholesale conclusions;
liability rules do not put manufacturers, MCOs, or providers out of business. Instead, the
damages recoverable in tort are specifically designed to allow injuries where efficient, such
that a device manufacturer, MCO, or doctor will go out of business only if held liable on
several occasions.
158 See MARQUIS DE CONDORCET, Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Theory
of Decision-Making, in CONDORCET: SELECTED WRITINGS 33, 52-55 (Keith Michael Baker
ed., 1976) (stating a mathematical theorem that voting groups become increasingly likely to
choose correct results as the groups grow in membership, as long as the groups’ members
are, on average, more likely to vote for the right answer than the wrong one); see also
Adrian Vermeule, Forward: System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 13
(2009) (“[W]here a group votes sincerely on two alternatives, one of which is correct, and
the members of the group are even slightly more likely to be right than wrong, then as the
number of members in the group increases, the probability that a majority vote of the group
is correct tends towards certainty.”).
159 States, of course, have high courts that can gather and see cases from all jurisdictions
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across stories is therefore limited. A federal agency, by contrast, gathers
stories nation-wide.
Furthermore, a federal agency can take note of any and all relevant
information, including, for example, stories from other countries in the case of
internationally marketed devices. This point presents another stark contrast
with judicial systems, which must constrain their review to the information
provided by the parties. Even in an adversarial system in which the parties
have incentives to present as much information as possible, the parties’ ability
to collect and present information will be resource constrained; they will be
able to collect only the information that they can afford to gather, and they will
likely choose to dedicate much of their resources to trial strategy rather than
information gathering. By contrast, executive agencies that have information
aggregation and expert regulation as their primary mandate will be more likely
to expend their resources on gathering and monitoring data.
In short, because the agency sees all individual stories in the nation and
because the agency has a greater incentive than litigants to gather information,
the federal regulator can reach more accurate conclusions160 and faster
conclusions than the state court. Federal executive agencies can therefore take
more decisive action.
A word about Medicaid: The informational problem in Medicaid is
somewhat different from the informational problems in the other three stories.
For Medicaid, the problem is not that aggregate information is needed.
Instead, the informational need for correcting Medicaid violations includes
knowledge of the complicated web of federal regulations, understanding of the
interactions between state and federal decision-makers, and appreciation for
the programmatic tradeoffs that are necessary in running public insurance for
the poor. Under the Equal Access Provision, for example, litigants ask courts
to determine whether a given reimbursement rate reduction will cause
Medicaid recipients to lose access to needed services, but determining the
long-term effects of a reimbursement rate reduction is difficult if not
impossible for a single, non-expert court.161 The problem is exacerbated by the
need to consider programmatic tradeoffs that become necessary in the face of
budgetary restrictions: Will Medicaid eligible people have better access to
services if rates are low and benefits are generous, or vice versa? Will public
health policy be better if lots of people are covered but are given only limited
public benefits or if only the very poorest people are covered but are given

in the state, but they are not usually in the habit of punishing repeat tortfeasors more harshly
because of the repetition. Furthermore, although it would not be difficult for one state court
to see what other state courts have decided, they are certainly not bound by one another’s
law and probably do not bother to research foreign jurisdictions’ experiences and decisions.
160 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
161 Moncrieff, supra note 1, at 687-88 (discussing the difficulty that courts faced in
determining whether Medicaid patients actually had “equal access” to healthcare services).
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generous public benefits? These systemic evaluations are better made in
expert agencies than in generalist courts.
In all four stories federal executive regulators have significant advantages
over state judicial regulators in their ability to correct informational failures.
In the three private market stories, a single expert body, operating nation-wide,
will do the best job of identifying and punishing bad actors. In Medicaid,
agencies will do a better job than either courts or voters at making decisions
about complicated policy tradeoffs.
2.

Agency Costs

With respect to agency cost, the benefits of federal executive regulation are
less clear. Individual enforcement in state courts might better correct those
costs by allowing individual victims to stand up for themselves (eliminating
the need for an agent), while federal executive enforcement might replicate
agency failures if it falls prey to interest group capture. That said, state courts
are not immune to capture; healthcare regulations might be less subject to
capture than fields like telecommunications and environmental law; and, to the
extent that capture is a problem, federal agencies can use individual
enforcement mechanisms to counteract (at least somewhat) their agency
failures.
As discussed in Part II.B, the agency failures in healthcare markets occur for
two reasons: an asymmetry of information and a misalignment of incentives
between principals (patients) and agents (insurers and providers). To correct
those failures, a legal regulator should not itself be subject to them. But as
public choice theory makes clear, all legal regulators are at least somewhat
subject to both of them. Since we have a choice between two possible
regulators, though, the relevant question is which of the two – state courts or
federal agencies – does a better job along these dimensions.
On the first, information asymmetry, state courts probably do better than
federal agencies, but to the extent that that’s true, it’s more of a curse than a
blessing. A single judicial proceeding is almost entirely transparent; the
litigants are involved in the case from the word go, and the court decides the
case based entirely on the information that the litigants present.162 Litigants
have easy access to (indeed, are usually given proactive notice of) all
information provided and arguments presented on both sides, including any
information that non-parties present, as through amicus briefs. As a result, all
vested interests (patients, payers, and providers) can see the decision-making
process of state courts without much difficulty, even if they are not particularly
good at evaluating the big-picture regulatory quality of those decisions, and
they can hold elected judges accountable for their regulatory decisions.
Furthermore, a court’s decision in a single case, if it will have precedential
effect, must be published with reasons given for the decision. Parties are
162 See infra Part IV.B.1 for further discussion of this function of private litigation and
for the suggestion that the function can be replicated in agencies.
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therefore able to monitor not only the judiciary’s resolutions of their particular
conflicts but also the judiciary’s overall regulatory approach to the relevant
regime.
The federal executive, by contrast, makes its decisions based on expert
evaluations and aggregated data that are hard for patients to understand. And
even though the Administrative Procedure Act forces a certain degree of
transparency in executive proceedings,163 affected parties are not as intimately
involved in executive regulatory decisions as they are in judicial ones.
Furthermore, because executive decision-making is open for comment from
any and all parties that might be interested in the decision, the regulatory
process often involves far too much information for any single party to read
and evaluate. Finally, regulatory decisions, unlike judicial ones, do not have to
be explained. The executive is not required to publish an equivalent to the
judicial opinion: a public expression of its logic for reaching a particular
regulatory outcome.164 Executive agencies, thus, may have more leeway – less
accountability – in regulating.
The state courts’ success here, though, is not necessarily something to
celebrate; it is merely the flip side of the courts’ failure to aggregate
information. True, state courts make transparent decisions based entirely on
individuals’ presentations. But that’s exactly why they don’t do a very good
job of reaching optimal decisions for healthcare regulation. An agency’s
relatively opaque process of evaluating systemic problems and offering
systemic solutions is, at worst, a necessary evil in a regime as complicated as
healthcare. Information asymmetry is the price we pay for better-informed
healthcare regulation.
On the second dimension of agency cost – misaligned incentives – state
courts may do a bit better than federal agencies, but the state courts’ advantage
might be less significant in healthcare than in other regulatory regimes like
telecommunications and environmental law. Here, the biggest risk is capture.
The fear is that moneyed interests like insurers, doctors, and manufacturers can
gain disproportionate influence over elected officials, especially as compared
to dispersed, unorganized interests like patients. Regulators’ incentive, then,
would be to please the organized lobbies rather than to serve the public
interest, creating a misalignment of incentives between patients and federal
agencies.165 State judges, of course, are usually elected and therefore lack the
163

See generally Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 543, 586-87 (2000).
164 That said, administrative law provides significant incentives for agencies to develop
records of their decision-making processes and to give public reasons for their decisions.
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237-38 (2000) (holding that only formal
rules, which require creation of a public record, will be entitled to judicial deference).
165 See Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After
Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1199 (2003) (“Big American business firms are not discrete
and insular minorities. They have exceptional access to influence in legislatures,
administrative agencies, and the courts through government advisory commissions, trade
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political insulation of Article III judges,166 but they might be less of a target
than federal executive regulators simply because they make dispersed, case-bycase decisions. That is, because courts do not usually effect broad-sweeping
regulatory change, even elected state judges might not attract the attention or
the pressure of interest groups, at least not nearly to the same extent as federal
agencies.
That said, even in individual litigation and even in litigation before insulated
judges, the playing field is not exactly level. Just as moneyed interests can
gain an advantage in wholesale regulation by donating to officials’ campaigns
and by monitoring regulatory processes, so too can these interests gain an
advantage in litigation by outspending their individual opponents – by hiring
better lawyers and fancier expert witnesses, filing more motions, dragging out
trials, etc.167 This failure is not a traditional capture story, but it is a similar
story of process failure that causes a similar distortion in regulatory incentives.
State courts might well respond more favorably to organized interests than to
disorganized ones, and they might therefore do only a marginally better job
than agencies of basing regulatory decisions on the general public interest.168
Additionally, there may be reason to believe that the traditional capture
story is less likely to be realized in healthcare than in other regulatory regimes.
In typical regulated industries, there is a clear division between the moneyed
interests and the public interest. In telecommunications law, one side of the
policy debate is comprised of the regulated firms, which are organized and
moneyed, while the other side is comprised of consumers, who are dispersed
and unorganized. In environmental law, one side is comprised of big business
polluters while the other is comprised of those that suffer from environmental
degradation – a group that has become increasingly organized and moneyed
over time but that still lacks the financial wherewithal and incentives of the
polluting industrial lobby.

associations, lobbies, and lawyers.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Institutional Choice and Political
Faith, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 959, 961 (1997) (discussion of public choice theory in
relation to business lobbies influence on regulators); Jennifer Arlen, Comment, The Future
of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1785 (1998) (“[P]owerful
business lobbies may induce regulators to declare as safe products that are not in fact
safe.”).
166 Stephen J. Choi et al., Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for
an Elected Rather Than Appointed Judiciary (Univ. of Chic. Law Sch., Olin Ctr. for Law &
Econ. Working Paper Series, No. 357, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1008989
(observing that most state judges are elected, not appointed).
167 See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 77 (1991) (“Small intensely interested groups are still likely to
spend more on their litigation efforts than any large diffuse groups opposing them.”).
168 We have evidence of this kind of distortion in medical malpractice litigation, where
juries are significantly more likely to err on the doctor’s side than on the patient’s side. See
Studdert & Mello, supra note 20, at S49-S53.
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In healthcare, by contrast, there are organized and moneyed interests on both
sides of the policy divide. In the medical malpractice example, doctors (an
organized lobby) might prefer professional self-regulation to anything that
CMS would offer and might therefore push the agency towards a laissez-faire
approach. But payers, including private insurance companies that are just as
organized and moneyed as doctors, have incentives to minimize patient injuries
and might therefore push CMS in the opposite direction, advocating hefty
regulatory intervention. Likewise for ESI, MCOs would favor laissez-faire,
but employers would favor regulation; for medical devices, manufacturers
would favor laissez-faire, but payers and providers would favor regulation; and
for Medicaid, states (a surprisingly organized lobby) would favor laissez-faire,
but providers strongly favor intervention. The relevant agencies in these four
stories – and in most healthcare regimes – would therefore be subject to
competing interests that would pull in opposite directions. It is possible that
this environment would prevent the agency from falling capture to any given
interest and would leave the agency freer than average to pursue the public
interest.
Even if this image of a regulatory tug-of-war – or the conclusion of publicinterest-oriented regulation – is too simplistic or rosy, it is possible for
regulatory design to minimize some of the agency problems that executive
regulators might face. Most importantly, the federal executive can and should
allow individual administrative claims. An individual claims process would
allow patients to inform the executive of their experiences, to have more direct
contact with the decision-making process, and to influence the development of
the regulatory environment in the same small way that the state courts allow
them to do, without requiring that actual decisions be made by generalist juries
and judges. Such a process would give individuals some power to act as their
own agents, as they do in state courts, and it would allow self-interested parties
to present an informational record to expert decision-makers.169 If we ever do
shift entirely to federal executive enforcement in these stories or others like
them, federal agencies ought therefore to establish administrative claims, like
those already available to Medicare beneficiaries and Social Security Disability
recipients, for example.
In sum, state courts might do better than federal administrators at
internalizing and representing the public interest if they are less subject to
capture than federal agencies, but their advantages are marginal (if not nonexistent in the unique world of healthcare), come at the expense of
informational deficits, and can be at least partially overcome through
administrative claims processes. For these four stories, therefore, courts might
be slightly better for correcting the markets’ agency failures, but that
advantage may not be worth its cost.

169 Such a process would therefore replicate many of the informational successes of state
courts. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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IV. WHAT NEXT?
Federal executive agencies, thus, bring many theoretical advantages to the
project of healthcare regulation. But that point alone does not answer the
question of how best to solve the current enforcement vacuum. There are three
possible regimes that we must consider, and the choice among them turns on
empirical questions about the cost-benefit tradeoff between state judicial
regulation and federal executive regulation.
First, we could allow concurrent regulatory authority, gaining the
advantages of federal executive regulation without losing any positive role that
state judicial regulation plays. In other words, we could encourage the federal
executive to fill its regulatory role while also re-empowering the judiciary, at
least in the federal courts if not in the state courts.170 Second, we could allow
the judiciary to play a much more limited role than it did before the Supreme
Court’s intervention, providing compensation to injured parties without
engaging in the regulatory aspects of tort. Such a system might depend on
courts’ acceptance of a regulatory compliance defense as an absolute bar to
liability.171 Third, we could completely eliminate the judicial role and shift all
regulatory functions to the federal executive.
This Part will reject the first option, offering compliance and error costs as a
reason to preserve and maybe enhance limits on the judiciary’s role. It will
then consider the other two options together, acknowledging the positive
functions of the judiciary but suggesting that we could create a more efficient
system by replicating those functions in the executive rather than retaining a
limited judicial role.
A.

Concurrent Authority
1.

The Possibility of Concurrent Authority

Before we get to compliance and error costs, we must first consider whether
judicial authority can be reinstated after the Supreme Court’s holdings and
state legislatures’ decisions. The answer, of course, is that it can be in all four
stories, though it requires congressional action in one story, executive or
congressional action in two, and state legislative action in the last.
For Medicaid, the Supreme Court’s holding applied to § 1983, holding that
the general right of action provided in that statute did not allow private
enforcement of Spending Clause conditions against state agencies unless those
conditions clearly intended to create and confer enforceable rights.
170 See Edward Alan Miller, Federal Administration and Judicial Oversight of Medicaid:
Policy Legacies and Tandem Institutions under the Boren Amendment, 38 PUBLIUS: J. OF
FEDERALISM 315, 328-29 (2008) (celebrating the combination of judicial and regulatory
oversight under the predecessor of the Equal Access Provision).
171 See, e.g., Lars Noah, Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuit of Symmetry in
Products Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2147, 2165 (1999) (arguing in favor of a regulatory
compliance defense for drug and device torts).
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(Remember, it was not even a Medicaid case that caused the vacuum here; it
was FERPA.)172 Congress, however, could insert an explicit right of action
into the Medicaid statute or could amend § 1983 to allow private enforcement
of Spending statute conditions. (Either of those options would create a right of
action in federal rather than state courts, but either amendment would
reauthorize judicial regulation of Medicaid conditions.)
For ESI, Congress could amend ERISA to allow for consequential and
punitive damages against insurers. It could do so either by amending the
“equitable relief” restriction in ERISA’s federal cause of action or by
amending ERISA’s preemption provisions to allow for state tort suits against
employer-sponsored insurers. Indeed, Congress came very close to passing the
latter amendment in 2001, when the so-called Patients’ Bill of Rights passed
both chambers but died in conference committee.173 Alternatively, without
congressional action, the Department of Labor could issue a formal rule,
establishing that ERISA’s “equitable relief” provision allows for consequential
and punitive damages in federal court.174
The story is the same for medical devices. Congress could either create a
federal right of action for device-related injuries or amend the FDCA’s
preemption provision to allow for state tort suits. In this case, too, it is
possible that the federal executive could change the meaning of the preemption
provision by issuing a formal rule that state tort suits are not “requirements”
for device safety. Given that FDA has changed its position on that question
several times in the past, though, the Supreme Court might deem the
interpretation to be unreasonable and thereby refuse deference.175 In any
event, the provision could certainly be changed, whether or not the change
would require congressional action.
For medical error, the reinstatement of full judicial authority would require
the state legislatures to repeal their damages caps. It is also possible that
Congress could create a federal cause of action for medical torts, empowering
the federal judiciary rather than state judiciaries, though such an approach
would be vulnerable to constitutional challenges, particularly on the ground
that medical practice does not constitute “interstate commerce.”176
172

Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 273 (2001).
Miller, supra note 86, at 1303.
174 See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
175 Under the second step of deference analysis, the court asks whether the agency’s
interpretation is “reasonable.” See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 845
(1983). If it is not, the court will not defer. Id.
176 See Perry H. Apelbaum & Samara T. Ryder, The Third Wave of Federal Tort Reform:
Protecting the Public or Pushing the Constitutional Envelope?, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 591, 593 (1999) (observing that federal medical malpractice reform raises difficult
constitutional questions); Betsy J. Grey, The New Federalism Jurisprudence and National
Tort Reform, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 475, 534 (2002) (suggesting that medical malpractice
might not be “economic activity” that can be subject to federal regulation under the
Commerce Clause); Collin Sult, Note, Questionable Medicine – Why Federal Medical
173
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In any event, there is no impenetrable barrier to the reauthorization of
judicial regulation in these four regimes – or in any regime. Congress and state
legislatures can certainly create rights of action to re-empower private
enforcement. Furthermore, a decision to re-empower the judiciary would not
be fundamentally incompatible with a decision to encourage the relevant
executive agencies to play a greater regulatory role. We could, then, allow
both branches to have full regulatory authority, with punitive damages
available in courts and regulatory oversight vested in agencies. Other
regulatory regimes follow this model with success,177 and there is no inherent
structural problem with allowing the branches to exercise concurrent authority.
2.

The Problems with Concurrent Authority

To argue that we should allow concurrent authority for these four stories of
health law, however, would be to miss the point. State judicial bodies are not
simply failing to get the job done; their flaws are actively detrimental to the
system, creating high and unnecessary costs for regulated entities. For our four
stories and probably for healthcare generally, state judicial regulation creates
high compliance costs (a problem with state regulation) and injects high error
costs (a problem with judicial regulation).
Compliance Costs. The first problem with state judicial regulation hinges
on the state-ness of it: With fifty independent jurisdictions creating rules, some
regulated entities will suffer higher-than-necessary compliance costs. This
problem is, of course, the motivation behind the preemption rules in ERISA
and in the FDCA. Medical device manufacturers benefit significantly from
regulatory uniformity since they sell their devices nation-wide, and employers
benefit significantly from such uniformity since they employ labor and provide
benefits across jurisdictions (if not nation-wide). Given that federal agencies
have authority to take over from the states and have superior capacity to the
states’ to reach regulatory optimality, there is no good reason to continue
suffering the compliance costs that come with state judicial regulation. Even if
state courts were simply settling claims for compensation, they would
Malpractice Reform May Be Unconstitutional, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 195, 198 (2005) (expressing
skepticism about the constitutionality of federal medical malpractice reform under the
“Supreme Court’s more recent pronouncements defining the scope of congressional power
under the Commerce Clause”).
177 Environmental law and its regulatory regime is one example of such success. See
Lois Schiffer & Timothy Dowling, Remark, Reflections on the Role of the Courts in
Environmental Law, 27 ENVTL. L. 327, 331-32 (1997) (attributing the effectiveness of
environmental policy to both legislation, such as the Clean Air Act, and to the courts for
their “vigorous enforcement and resolution of exactly what the new [environmental] statutes
required from the executive and from private parties”). But see Thomas O. McGarity, The
Complementary Roles of Common Law Courts and Federal Agencies in Producing and
Using Policy-Relevant Scientific Information, 37 ENVTL. L. 1027, 1044 (2007) (exploring
the limits on communication between common law courts and EPA, and suggesting reforms
to enhance information exchange).
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necessarily impose regulatory duties for manufacturers and employers that
might vary across jurisdictions, necessarily deciding when compensatory
damages are due and when they are not. Concurrent jurisdiction between state
and federal regulators, thus, does not solve the uniformity need for
manufacturers and employers.
Of course, that uniformity need is less acute for medical malpractice178 and
Medicaid. In those stories, variation among states probably would not be a
significant problem since providers tend to operate in a single state. Even in a
country with fifty different legal regimes, individual providers (including
hospitals) would need to learn and to abide by only one set of negligence rules
and only one set of Medicaid reimbursement formulae because their practice is
ordinarily confined to a single state.179 Similarly, liability insurers probably do
not benefit much from national medical malpractice standards since they write
state-specific policies for actuarial reasons. If compliance costs were the only
reason to eliminate state judicial regulation, then, we might consider
maintaining state courts’ role in medical malpractice and state agencies’
answerability for Medicaid.
Error Costs. The second problem with state judicial regulation – and the
problem with allowing federal judicial regulation rather than moving entirely
to the executive – hinges on the judicial-ness of it: Juries and judges make bad
decisions when confronted with single healthcare cases, leading to systemic
error costs.180 This problem is significant for all four of our stories, as should
be apparent from the pervasive discussion of information costs. For ESI,
devices, and malpractice, the source of the error has been well-canvassed in the
Article so far: Courts (especially juries) do a bad job of evaluating causation.181
As a result, they issue both false positives and false negatives. Good MCOs,
devices, and providers get punished, but bad ones go free; inevitable injuries
get compensated while preventable ones do not. Regulated entities then invest
in avoiding liability in an arbitrary system, a wasteful investment since
arbitrary rules fail to incentivize greater safety or welfare.182
For Medicaid, too, the problem with courts is that they lack the wide-angle
lens necessary to evaluate something like a reimbursement rate reduction. The
systemic evaluations necessary to shape a Medicaid program are better made in

178

Moncrieff, supra note 4, at 859-61 (reciting the arguments against a uniformity need
for medical malpractice).
179 It is a reasonable question, however, whether this is an artifact of fifty different legal
regimes – whether nation-wide providers (perhaps on a Kaiser-like model, but across state
lines) would emerge if the federal government took over regulation.
180 See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2006) (discussing the limits
of judicial decision-making and urging a greater executive role in interpreting statutes).
181 See supra Part II.B.2 & Part II.B.4.
182 This point is perhaps best-known in the malpractice context, where arbitrary litigation
rules incentivize defensive medicine on the part of individual providers rather than
appropriate precaution on the part of systemic entities.

2376

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90: 2323

expert agencies than in generalist courts, and the cost of error could be
significant if, for example, courts unwittingly move Medicaid beneficiaries
into emergency rooms.
***
Importantly, the problem with concurrent authority here is not at all inherent
to concurrency.183 The problem is that state and judicial decision-making,
whether occurring alongside federal executive decision-making or not, imposes
costs on the system. Those costs might be worth bearing if state courts were
the only option for regulation or were a significantly better option than their
available alternatives. But given the presence of alternative regulators with
superior expertise in the federal executive, we might be able to avoid the
compliance and error costs that come with state judicial rulemaking by vesting
exclusive authority in federal agencies.
B.

Exclusive Executive Authority

Ought we, then, to shift exclusively to executive authority? As noted, the
groundwork for that shift is already laid; in each of our four regulatory
regimes, some federal agency already has authority to regulate. But shifting to
exclusive executive authority would eliminate any benefits that we get out of
private litigation. Furthermore, the federal agencies that are poised to regulate
in our four stories have not (yet) been doing a good job of playing the
regulatory role. We must therefore ask two questions: (1) Are the benefits of
exclusive executive regulation worth their costs, namely the lost values of
private litigation in the state judicial system? (2) What needs to be done to
motivate and optimize federal executive regulation of Medicaid, ESI, medical
devices, and medical malpractice? This part of the Article will address these
questions in turn, particularly considering whether courts should retain a
limited, compensatory role in healthcare regulation.
1.

The Values of Private Litigation

The first potential problem with shifting authority fully to the federal
executive is that the shift might (unless carefully designed) sacrifice the
benefits of private litigation. The question, then, is what we get out of private
litigation and whether those benefits are worth preserving, either by retaining a
limited judicial role or by replicating the benefits in executive forums.
Although there are several such benefits for healthcare regulation, a carefully
designed administrative system can replicate them and might be able to
improve on them.
Information Gathering. Perhaps the most relevant advantage of private
litigation for present purposes is that it exposes information about private

183 The problem here is not merely one of “coordinating sanctions” between the
executive and the judiciary, as a recent manuscript puts it. See Logue, supra note 14.
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parties’ behavior – information that administrative agencies currently have a
hard time gathering and that, once revealed through litigation, can be important
Although agencies currently have some
to executive regulation.184
investigatory tools and certainly engage in some information-gathering,185 the
discovery process in private litigation provides a much more extensive toolbox
for information-gathering than any currently available to agencies.186
This point might seem inconsistent with the central claims of this paper –
particularly the claim that information about individual cases, revealed in
litigation, is insufficient for regulation. While that is certainly true – that
litigation-based information is not sufficient for regulation – it is also true that
some litigation-based information may be necessary (or at least very useful)
for regulators. Particularly in the regulatory regimes involving corporations
(MCOs and device manufacturers), tort claims allow the plaintiff to gather
information about the corporation’s knowledge or intent. Such information
might include, for example, proof of a manufacturer’s knowledge of private
safety and effectiveness studies or proof of an MCO’s explicit corporate policy
to reject valid claims.187 That information, in turn, might be highly useful to
administrative regulation (even though it is potentially difficult for judicial
agents to understand or to act upon such information without additional
systemic information), and information about corporate knowledge or intent
might give an agency new cause or new jurisdiction to intervene.188 As an
184 See Gostin, supra note 63, at 2315 (“The tort system has another benefit that is not
often fully recognized – through the discovery process, it can compel corporations to
disclose everything they know, or reasonably should know, about the product’s safety and
effectiveness.”); Robert L. Rabin, Keynote Paper: Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88
GEO. L.J. 2049, 2068-70 (1999) (describing the information-gathering and informationrevealing virtues of tort). Administrative regulators can then take advantage of that
information in making later regulatory decisions. Gostin, supra, at 2315 (“The discovery
process provides a ‘feedback loop’ to the FDA, which in the past has changed its regulatory
decisions in light of information revealed in court.”).
185 For example, tobacco regulation is often cited as an instance in which litigation
revealed information of corporate abuses, see Gostin, supra note 63, at 2315, but FDA was
actively investigating those abuses at the same time. See DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF
INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A DEADLY INDUSTRY 357-93 (2001) (telling the
story of FDA’s investigation into tobacco industry intent, leading up to FDA’s assertion of
jurisdiction over tobacco products in 1997).
186 See David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s
Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461, 492 (2008) (asserting that
“the information-gathering tools lawyers have in litigation are, by any measure, more
extensive than the FDA’s”).
187 The Vioxx litigation is a good example of this function of tort; plaintiffs were able to
discover, relevantly for FDA, that Merck knew about the heart risks of Vioxx and hid that
information from FDA during the drug’s approval process.
188 In the tobacco case, for example, FDA would have jurisdiction over nicotine only if
the tobacco companies knew that nicotine was addictive and intended to sell tobacco
products as a drug. Knowledge and intent were therefore central to FDA’s assertion of
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information-revealing mechanism, therefore, private litigation might serve an
important function.
Compensation. The second benefit of state judicial regulation, particularly
through tort, is that it provides compensation to injured parties. (This point is
irrelevant to the Medicaid story, where the injury is regulatory rather than
personal.) Compensation serves two important goals: First, it spreads risk
among all consumers of the relevant good or service, rather than forcing the
unlucky few who are injured to bear the full cost of that risk,189 and second, it
serves non-utilitarian values of social justice and morality, requiring an
injuring party to make its victims whole. These values are independent of any
ex ante regulatory benefit of compensation. That is, compensation does not
merely provide an incentive for producers to be careful; it also forces insurers,
manufacturers, and doctors to spread the risk of error among their consumers
(through price increases) and to recompense their injured consumers for the
harms that they cause.
Experimentation and Responsiveness. The third and final benefit of state
judicial regulation is that it has the potential to be experimental with regulatory
approaches and to be responsive to new regulatory needs. Both of these values
are significantly weaker for state judicial regulation than for state executive or
legislative regulation, but they might nevertheless be present to a certain extent
in our four stories.
Experimentation is a known advantage of state control;190 different states
can try different approaches to Medicaid, ESI, and medical torts, allowing the
country as a whole to learn from different experiences in different places. Of
course, the judiciary is not a coordinated regulator than can engage in selfconscious experiments the way that a state executive or legislature can, and the
judiciary has a harder time trying new approaches than the political branches,
given the path dependence of the common law. But the possibility for
variation among the states does provide some opportunity to test the relative
successes of different approaches.
The state judiciary might also be better situated than the federal executive to
respond to new regulatory needs since it is a smaller organ of government that
is more accessible to affected parties.191 The state judiciary might therefore
gain information about changing circumstances faster than the federal
executive. Again, though, the judiciary’s tie to precedent – the path
dependence of judicial regulation – might significantly weaken this advantage
of state regulation in the contexts that are relevant here, all of which center on
private litigation.
jurisdiction. See KESSLER, supra note 185, at 355-58.
189 See Rabin, supra note 184, at 2070-74 (describing the compensation goals of tort and
their failure in most administrative regimes, but noting that some administrative schemes do
replicate compensation).
190 Moncrieff, supra note 4, at 880.
191 See id.
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Replicating Litigation Values in the Executive

Perhaps, in light of these values of private litigation, we ought to preserve at
least some role for the state judiciary in regulating our four stories. At a
minimum, the state judiciary could continue to play its compensatory role,
allowing plaintiffs to file claims in state courts for compensatory damages and
to conduct full discovery.
But we need not take it for granted that the values of state judicial regulation
are better captured in the state judiciary than in the federal executive. Indeed,
many of those values can be replicated quite easily in the federal executive and
might ultimately operate more efficiently in that forum.
Information Gathering. As previously noted, agencies already conduct
investigations when deciding whether and how to regulate, but the tools they
currently have for that project are insufficient, particularly when compared to
the tools available to lawyers in discovery. But surely regulatory agencies can
be given better tools: greater subpoena powers, perhaps powers to search and
seize in compliance with the Fourth Amendment, and more money to hire
investigators. If given such tools, in fact, agencies might do better than
lawyers at discovering relevant information since they would have a greater
scope of “relevancy” than litigators; litigators advocate a single client’s
interests (or, in the case of a class action, a single group’s interests) while
agencies represent the collective interest.192 Furthermore, agencies might do a
better job than litigants of deciding whom to investigate. Plaintiffs and their
lawyers have incentives to go after the deepest pockets they can find,
regardless of whether those actors are the most responsible for creating
unjustified risks. Agencies would have no such distortion in their incentives to
investigate.
One caveat to this discussion is that litigants don’t just gather the relevant
information but also serve as whistle-blowers, pointing out the actors (such as
Medicaid agencies, MCOs, devices, and doctors) that are causing the most
harm. Even if they might sometimes sue the wrong party from an efficiency
standpoint, they still point to products and systems that are causing problems.
But the executive can set up administrative channels for injured parties to
serve that same function – and can make it cheaper for injured parties to do so
– by establishing an administrative claims process. Such a process would
require less investment in terms of court filings and fancy lawyers, meaning
that even parties with small injuries might step forward to blow the whistle –
something that rarely happens in the high-cost world of tort litigation.
Compensation. As with information gathering, there is no reason to think
that the compensation value of state judicial regulation is unique to that forum;
administrative agencies can also establish victim compensation funds and can
allow individual claims for damages. Indeed, models for this possibility
already exist for workplace accidents and vaccines.193 Administrative
192
193

Assuming they aren’t captured. See supra Part III.B.2.
See Rabin, supra note 184, at 2074.
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compensation funds naturally serve the risk-spreading goal of compensation,
whether funded from general revenue or from targeted taxes paid by injurers,
allowing cost of risk to be spread among the tax base or among consumers of
the relevant product or service. And if funded by a targeted tax or if provided
through claims adjudication by the agency, administrative compensation can
also serve social justice goals, requiring risk-creators to internalize the cost of
the injuries they cause.
Experimentation and Responsiveness.
The experimentation and
responsiveness advantages of state control are similarly replicable in federal
agencies. With respect to experimentation, federal agencies can (and often do,
particularly in CMS) run demonstration projects to test new policy ideas. The
federal agencies, in fact, might run more useful experiments than states since
they can select populations by statistically relevant criteria (rather than by
arbitrary state boundaries). Regulators might also learn better from federal
demonstration projects than from state judicial experimentation since data
about such experiments flow to a single entity – the federal agency – rather
than needing to be conveyed to dispersed state courts.
As for responsiveness, the state judiciary’s relative advantage is not terribly
significant given that agencies already have mechanisms by which the public
can notify regulators of new circumstances, including public comment
procedures when the agency is actively considering regulatory change and
petitions for rulemaking when the agency is not actively considering such
change. But the agency could create an even cheaper mechanism to gather
information about changing circumstances and evolving needs by establishing
administrative adjudication of individual claims. Through a claims process,
agencies would receive the same kind of information that the state judiciary
would get about harmful products or services, and they would receive that
information just as quickly as the state judicial system. The federal executive
might, with such a mechanism, be even more responsive than the state
judiciary since it would not be path dependent in its regulatory choices.
3.

Improving Executive Regulation

The final question to consider is what needs to be done to improve the
federal executive’s regulatory efforts. Importantly, this Article absolutely is
not and should not be understood to be an endorsement of the current
regulatory environment for Medicaid, ESI, devices, or malpractice. Although I
have greater faith than some in the capacities of our federal executive
regulators and although I believe that those regulators have the legal authority
they need to assert control over the four healthcare regimes I address, I
certainly do not mean to suggest that the agencies’ status quo efforts are
sufficient – or even that the status quo agencies are currently capable of
assuming full regulatory control. What, then, needs to be done to enable
exclusive executive regulation of these four regimes?
The short answer is that we need to give them more money. The biggest
barrier to robust federal executive regulation right now is the agencies’
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shortage of resources for enforcing their statutes. To engage in robust
regulation, the agencies need bigger staffs and more funding.194 Those
provisions, of course, need to come from Congress.
The longer answer is that we probably ought to restructure the agencies to
clarify the agencies’ responsibilities and to signify the importance of the
regulatory projects at issue here. All three relevant agencies – CMS for
Medicaid and malpractice, DOL for ESI, and FDA for devices – have
structured themselves with different goals in mind, other than the regulatory
projects at issue here, and they operate in complex regulatory environments in
which they sometimes compete with other agencies for jurisdiction over single
healthcare problems.195 PPACA, in fact, has made this problem worse with
respect to employer-sponsored insurance.196 If we want the federal executive
to become the exclusive regulator for these regimes, we need to consolidate
power not only in the executive but also, within the executive, in a single
department, giving a single agency – probably a single office within a single
agency – the task of monitoring each of these regimes.
Furthermore, as noted above, the federal executive should structure itself so
as to replicate the advantages of state judicial regulation: information
gathering, individual compensation, experimentation, and responsiveness.
Each agency ought to establish an administrative claims process that will allow
injured patients to seek redress for their injuries, and Congress ought to give
the agencies greater resources and tools for information-gathering.
These changes to the federal executive regulatory environment would
require some congressional action, but they would not require substantive
amendments to the relevant regulatory statutes, all of which already authorize
administrative regulation. The move, therefore, should be relatively easy to
implement and therefore seems well worth the effort.

194

See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-581, FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION: FDA FACES CHALLENGES MEETING ITS GROWING MEDICAL PRODUCT
RESPONSIBILITIES AND SHOULD DEVELOP COMPLETE ESTIMATES OF ITS RESOURCE NEEDS 34
(2009) (raising concern for the lack of funding and resources devoted to FDA’s medical
products oversight); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-106, WHISTLEBLOWER
PROTECTION PROGRAM: BETTER DATA AND IMPROVED OVERSIGHT WOULD HELP ENSURE
PROGRAM QUALITY AND CONSISTENCY 40-41 (2009) (asserting that the Department of
Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration lacks funds to fully implement its
program to investigate whistleblower complaints); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-08-54, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES: INTERNAL CONTROL
DEFICIENCIES RESULTED IN MILLIONS OF QUESTIONABLE CONTRACT PAYMENTS 45 (2007)
(finding that CMS neglected to devote sufficient resources to appropriately process contract
awards). CMS’s response to its oversight deficiencies, the Recovery Audit Contractor
program, came under a substantial amount of criticism during its initial years.
195 See, e.g., Margaret G. Farrell, ERISA Preemption and Regulation of Managed Health
Care: The Case for Managed Federalism, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 251, 277-81 (1997)
(observing that six federal agencies have jurisdiction over some aspect of managed care).
196 See EBSA Unified Agenda, supra note 15.

2382

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90: 2323

CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court’s and state legislatures’ decisions might be a
bit premature – predating robust federal executive involvement – the instinct
they represent is a good one. Particularly for health law, an area that has a
long history of administrative regulation, the shift from state judicial regulation
to federal executive regulation is a wise shift. At this point in the history of
health law, we should embrace the reallocation of regulatory authority,
recognizing healthcare regulation as an aggregate rather than individual project
and shifting authority to a big-picture regulator. For that project, federal
executive agencies are significantly better positioned than state courts.

